Why should state enterprises “channel” public opinion?
By David Bandurski — We wrote last month at CMP about how Hu Jintao’s policy of active agenda-setting and “public opinion channeling” — what we’ve termed Control 2.0 — has enshrined the notion of public opinion as crisis. In other words, party leaders often approach real crises of public interest as public relations challenges. On the surface, at least, they seem less concerned with addressing real social problems, and more concerned with convincing everyone these problems do not exist.
In a piece posted last week at the website Oeeee.com (奥一), writer Xiao Hanjie (肖汉杰) argued along similar lines after Huang Danhua (黄丹华), vice-director of China’s State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council encouraged state-owned enterprises to set up press offices to combat “negative news.”
[ABOVE: Knocking the news dead: a government spokeswoman for the city of Changsha is voted one of China's ten prettiest government spokeswomen.]
Why, Xiao asked, when enterprises should be concerned with identifying and addressing problems in restructuring and operation, was the focus on “channeling public opinion”?
A full translation of Xiao’s editorial follows:
“Public opinion channeling” not as good as “being channeled by public opinion”
September 2, 2009The vice-director of the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, Huang Danhua (黄丹华) said recently that a number of central-level enterprises had been beset with “negative news coverage.” He advised that central-level enterprises set up news release systems and employ official spokespeople in order to improve channeling of public opinion (Beijing Morning Post, September 1, 2009).
So problems happen, and the reaction is not to establish supervision mechanisms to look into their own long-established bad practices. No, instead they set up news release structures so they can “channel public opinion.” So it’s as though they assume when the bells go off that the problem doesn’t lie in the system and in their own work, but rather in the fact that there are no spokespeople to carry out public opinion channeling.
Channeling public opinion? Isn’t it more to the point to say they dread public opinion? They say they channel public opinion “in order to create a favorable public opinion environment for the reform of state-owned enterprises.” I disagree with this completely . . . Public opinion can reflect on advantages and disadvantages, and so it can assist central-level enterprises in assessing their own faults and strengths. Why, then, would you attempt to channel public opinion, twisting its original purpose and the spirit of free criticism? And in a false public opinion environment, how are central-level enterprises supposed to assess their own advantages and disadvantages?
A French writer once wrote that “without the freedom to criticize, praise is utterly worthless.” This could no doubt be taken as a jab at the idea that central-level enterprises should “channel public opinion.” Public opinion channeling is about releasing “positive news” and avoiding “negative news,” about talking up political achievements and playing down problems. This process affects the ability of the public to really understand the facts and come to their own judgments, and ultimately it does harm to the public’s freedom of expression. If we begin to see public opinion turning very kind in favor of state-owned enterprises, what meaning is there in that?
What’s more, the “tactic” of public opinion channeling is generally about not publicly airing news and information and the voices of public opinion, about letting the public see only those things that are “praiseworthy.” This is a disservice to the factual nature of the news, and an invasion of the public’s right to know. The principals of journalism tell us that the news should convey comprehensive and objective facts. The people have a right to know the full story, and they have a right to freely express their opinions about news fact.
“Public opinion channeling” is good for problem avoidance, but it cannot resolve problems that are objectively there. How much better it would be to channelled [in our actions] by public opinion, first listening to what public opinion is telling us, then promoting those things that are beneficial while abolishing those things that are harmful . . .
Along with the development of the Internet and other new media, as speech is becoming freer by the day, “public opinion channeling” is not a reasonable method, and is not suited to the information spirit of the age. As for the “negative news” facing public institutions and state enterprises, the urgent priority should be to accept public opinion and criticism, seeking out the problems that exist at the institutional and management level and making changes. The thought should not be with how to lead and channel public opinion, allowing the rot to take root inside our enterprises.
[Posted by David Bandurski, September 6, 2009, 8:57am HK]
Related Posts
- More hard words on China’s “war for public opinion”
Is public opinion the problem, or the solution? 
China and the “crisis” of public opinion 
“Public opinion preparation” begins for the next CCP session 
“Public opinion will not lose”: Chinese media heat up over the attempted arrest of a reporter in Beijing - “Temple Slayer” debate centers on public opinion and judicial independence in China
[...] Anniversary of the People’s Republic of China. Receiving it reminded me of a recent David Bandurski post on the China Media Project (about Control 2.0), while reading it reminded me of propaganda passages [...]
Kerstin:
Thanks for your comment.
Yes, certainly “guidance of public opinion” is a term quite commonly used for analysis of contemporary media policy in China. And we have used the term more frequently than most, so if you’ve seen it we’re probably responsible anyway.
But “guidance” and “channeling” (I might be OK with “shaping” too) are very different terms with different histories. “Correct guidance of public opinion” is a Jiang Zemin-era term arising as a direct result of what were seen as the failed media policies of Zhao Ziyang ahead of June 4, 1989.
“Channeling,” or yulun yindao, is a term that came into prominence only last year. And it is used in coordination with “guidance of public opinion.”
So the two terms (and their objectives) should not be confused. You can see a definition of “guidance” in our dictionary section.
Thanks again,
David
Dear David,
Thanks a lot for your great work, taking a lot of useful information from it. Sorry to see some of these frustrating frictions…
The China study can be a very odd field, difficult to navigate through the multiplicity of biases and odd twists.
Unfortunately, i cannot contribute to the translation issue, as I have no idea what the original Chinese term says. I dont think channeling is a heavy loaded term, but rather more unused than other ones, however, if I may add I have seen ‘guidance of public opinion’ used as a concept for critical analysis of contemporary media policy in China, exactly in the way you propose, as a subtle mixture of old style tactics and balance act with demands of a pluralizing society. That was somewhere in the Journal of Contemporary China, I think in some articles from 2007.
Best,
Kerstin
In China, reporters get beaten up, they get beaten up
During Olympics, they said anyone can go anywhere report any news
Who’s to uncover injustices, injustices, injustices?
No checks and balances, no checks and balances
Let the possible perpetrators do the covering, the channeling or be opinion leaders
Let the person who does your mother do the reporting
Let the person who does your mother do the leading
Let the person who does your mother do the channeling
I just wonder why there isn’t any press freedom in China?
I just wonder why there isn’t any press freedom in China?
I just wonder why there isn’t any press freedom in China?
I just wonder why there isn’t any press freedom in China?
I just wonder why there isn’t any press freedom in China?
Should we be proud of it?
This is already a one-party state
This is already a one-party state
This is already a one-party state
It controls all public opinion
It monitors all public opinion
It controls all public opinion
It monitors all public opinion
Yes, wgj. Thank you for teaching us all about discipline. Your guidance is appreciated.
It’s not naivete, it’s discipline. As journalists like to say, all news reporting are biased to a degree, but it doesn’t mean who aren’t trying to keep it to the minimum. The same goes for translators. When facing several choices for a translation, the one with the least amount of additional interpretation should be picked.
Wgj:
I’m sorry, but that’s incredibly naive. All translation also has an element of interpretation.
Best,
David
I’m saying that the way you translate, you’re adding your own interpretation into it, which constitutes subliminal commentary. For sure translators can be commentators, too, but not at the same time — it’s like the separation between news and commentary in the media. Translations should to be performed in a “strict constructionist” way, which yours clearly aren’t.
Wgj:
Thank you for your comments. I fail to see how the CCP’s considerations dictate the truthfulness or not of translations. But perhaps someone will be enlightened by your points here.
Best,
David
You don’t think “channel” is a term loaded with a hint of manipulation? I’m not a native English speaker, but all the things I can associate with “channel” in the political context are negative (or neutral at best, like “going through proper channels”, which still sounds like a sarcastic reminder of the bureaucratic machinery).
I would have no objection if you yourself describe the modus operandi of the Central Publicity Department as “channeling”, but its not a truthful translation for (semi-)official publications of the CCP because it doesn’t consider itself “an authority [solely based on] authoritarian control”. Read by people who do find “channel” loaded, it would seem that the CCP is openly admitting “propaganda controls” as its objective, which it doesn’t.
If you think “lead” sounds too democratic, let me suggest “guide”. It would be the most natural translation for “引导”, and “guiding public opinion” is used in the West as well.
As for the “hydrological theme”, that again is too much subjective interpretation. Translation are supposed to be true to what the original actually says, not what the author had supposedly wanted to say.
David:
Thanks for the enjoyable exchange. I do wonder where I condemned “anything Chinese officials do” as bad? Are you sure you aren’t attributing to me a general negativity in China coverage that personally irks you? The above piece borrowed much of its tone, in fact, from the Chinese editorial included in translation. I’ll post a similar editorial from Guangzhou Daily later today.
You have a problem with “control” as the main metaphor? But control isn’t really operating on a metaphorical level here. What do you think propaganda discipline is? . . .
It’s as though you’re relucant to talk about “control” or “restriction” because that suggests the CCP is acting in an authoritarian manner with its press policy. But isn’t it?
Sure, there are trends like the State Council’s national ordinance on information disclosure. Sure, there are some people within the CCP who would like a more open policy on information. And we can certainly give Hu Jintao’s “new pattern of public opinion guidance” the benefit of the doubt as you say.
But scholarship demands we do more than just say, “Look, it seems like they’ve done an OK job with reforms these 30 years, let’s see where this press policy goes.” That “guidance” remains the fundamental policy can be seen clearly in the CCP discourse. If you doubt that “guidance” is about control, I suggest you sit down face to face with Chinese journalists. And we have to look at the real environment and how it is stacking up against journalists. How is it any fairer to China to ignore the objective facts, for example, that tell us China is moving backward in certain important areas, like investigative reporting, since 2005?
How can we not reflect these changes in our assessment of overall media policy?
As you’re giving Hu the benefit of the doubt, you might think also about China’s professional journalists.
Best,
David
Wgj:
A fair enough suggestion, I suppose. But why do you find “channeling” loaded? Loaded with what?
It is precisely because this works in concert with propaganda controls (directives, etc.) that it is more properly “channeling” and not “leading.” Leading seems to imply a more open playing field. Opinion leaders “lead” by virtue of an authority or credibility that does not arise from authoritarian control. Following them, or their version of events, is a choice, and not the only choice.
Chinese officials, and scholars, have often used hydrological metaphors (dams, dikes, channels) to talk about how information controls are conceived in China. So this translation actually comes very close, I would argue, to touching on the CCP’s cultural outlook on public opinion and the need to dominate it in order to maintain order.
Best,
David
David,
thanks for your fast reply.
I get your argument (and the context, and where that is coming from), I just happen not to agree with it.
As I mentioned the UK only as a comparison, I won’t go into details there, but merely mention that Tony Blair’s Labour government did indeed influence and control (via carefully managed ‘friendships’ with several of the big newspaper owners and threats of exclusion from all government briefings) much of the UK media between 1999 and 2004 (or thereabout) and was rarely if ever questioned on any of their policies, their obvious lies, etc.
On the Chinese sphere, though. I do think that using ‘Control’ as main metaphor conveys the wrong image (by the way, the Berlin Wall went through incarnations 1.0 all the way to 4.5… for what it’s worth). I implies that those who exercise the control do so to exercise control. Power to use/keep power.
Apologies to Jeff Goldkorn – I couldn’t remember anymore where I had heard the term first – but the term (Net) Nanny seems to imply that there are other intentions beyond the mere continuance of power. While Chinese politicians are just as eager as their Western counterparts to keep power (maybe more so, but then Jiang Zemin did give up his power, and probably so will Hu Jintao… without elections even), they do still profess to have the aim of ‘developing China’ and wanting ‘harmony’ to do so. While ‘we’ might not agree with the goals or the methods, I am not quite willing to then turn around and to condemn anything Chinese politicians do as automatically ‘bad’.
Would more ‘freedom’ be desirable in China? – Absolutely.
Do government officials severely limit the freedom of expression in China? – Absolutely.
Are they bad intentioned in doing so? – Who knows? – I don’t and prefer to give them the benefit of the doubt. Their track record over the past 30 years allows for at least that – despite all the problems, mistakes, crimes, etc.
I am NOT arguing that China / Chinese Media / Chinese Internet are ‘free’, but I am worried that your words are only offering a black and white picture of a situation that is mostly grey…
“Channeling” is a loaded and thus bias translation (just like “control” was in case of Jackie Chan). I’d suggest “lead”: state media should be “public opinion leaders”, a term widely used in the West.
David:
First off, thank you for the feedback, and I did get a good chuckle over the spin you put on my position by the simple addition of “complaining.” Very effective, that.
But let me help you out of a heap of misunderstandings here. Have Chinese leaders studied UK spin-doctoring? Absolutely. But Chinese officials are not at all behaving like politicians in Europe, the U.S. or Canada because the fundamental nature of China’s press control system (and its political system) means the relationship between Chinese officials and the press is completely different. These tactics become something altogether different in the atmosphere of continuing and in fact intensifying “propaganda discipline.”
The Central Propaganda Department and the vast system of press controls it sits atop is still very much in place. When a local party secretary exercises direct control over local party and commercial media (including websites), when he then takes active measures to not just “control” these media (by directing against certain coverage) but actually directs them to be used more effectively to push his narrow agendas — how can you possibly assume this is simply UK-style “spin”?
Let’s not be naive.
As to our choice of terminologies . . . For what it’s worth, the term “Control 2.0″ was used by a top Chinese journalist at a closed-door forum to describe the new central-level approach to propaganda policy and how they were directly feeling the effects. Not just one, but several journalists, including those from major websites, said they were no longer just being “controlled,” but were now also being actively “used.”
Furthermore, Hu Jintao has clearly articulated the change in policy and talked openly about a new version of news and propaganda policy. He has spoken about a “new pattern of public opinion guidance” combining the old focus on “guidance of public opinion” (which includes propaganda discipline) and more effective yulun yindao, or “channeling of public opinion.”
I’d be happy to see the results of a popular poll on the subject, but I find your association of “Control 2.0″ with Iron Curtain stereotypes strange. This is a metaphor of technology, or technique, upgrade. Jiang Zemin’s post-Tiananmen regime of “guidance of public opinion” was version one. Hu Jintao’s upgrade maintains “guidance,” or control, as the fundamental principle (and, again, has intensified it), but adds a new brand of authoritarian spin control. There is also, of course, the imbedded reference to Web 2.0, because the Internet has provided much of the impetus for the CCP’s change in strategy.
Net Nanny, which I understand is Jeremy Goldkorn’s term, does not at all encompass the trends we’re talking about. That’s a complete non sequitur. The “Net Nanny doubles as a spin doctor”? Net Nanny, as I understand it, is a metaphor (which I quite like) for technical web controls. How does that possibly encompass the fact that human propaganda officials are issuing directives against coverage of a mass incident (a warning with real political force for media and journalists to stay in line), sending human Xinhua reporters into the field to report limited facts quickly that then get amplified through the commercial media, including websites (often by explicit propaganda instruction), holding a quick press conference to get out their “authoritative” version and announcing everything is under control, THEN sending out another series of directives telling media not to “look back” on the incident and not to editorialize . . . Net Nanny? Really?
Hu Jintao would not doubt be greatly amused to know that “this is something many expat bloggers in China have wanted China to do for years.” But as you seem to believe this is a fancy of my Red-Scare imagination, I refer you back to Hu Jintao’s speech of June 20, 2008. Perhaps you should spend more time reading policy statements and the CCP discourse on this issue — to balance out the expat China blogs.
You might also bear in mind that CCP press control tactics are more intricate and, yes, stranger, than most any of us CAN imagine.
Thanks again.
Best,
David
Hmmm,… it seems to me that you are complaining that Chinese government officials are behaving more and more like politicians in Europe or the US/Canada. “Spin” and “Spin-Doctors” were not invented in China, they are UK products. The notion that politicians PR-manage problems instead of solving them, is also a very ‘Western’ one (the Chinese concept of ‘face’ notwithstanding). Calling this “Control 2.0″ (just like the former metaphor GFW) merely evokes the tired old (and in my opinion wrong) notion that China is somehow very similar to the former USSR.
Using Rebecca’s (and Lokman’s?) term “Net Nanny” seems more appropriate for what is happening – and now the Net Nanny doubles as a spin doctor. This is not a sinister new development, but something many expat bloggers in China have wanted China to do for years (see e.g. http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200811/chinese-progress).
Why try to make China seem stranger than it really is?