Why China’s left is up in arms

In recent months we have noted a resurgence of China’s hardline Maoist left. It can be glimpsed symbolically in the red pageantry of Bo Xilai (薄熙來), the former commerce minister and now Chongqing head honcho who has suspended advertising at his official television network and filled the lineup with “red culture” programming — and who has his propaganda chiefs, like so many Pied Pipers, leading the local population in “red songs” to commemorate the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party.

It could be glimpsed earlier this year in the sudden prominence of Chen Kuiyuan (陈奎元), vice-chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and dean of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, an anti- “bourgeois liberalization” attack dog who sat with propaganda czar Li Changchun (李长春) when media control policy for 2011 was drummed home to national propaganda ministers. It could be read in and between the lines of the address to this year’s National People’s Congress by politburo standing committee member Wu Bangguo (吴邦国), in which he said China might “descend into an abyss of internal chaos” if it veered from the current political system.

The examples seem too numerous to admit doubt . . .

The silencing of Xin Ziling (辛子陵), a former official at the China National Defense University and a well-known “liberal,” who has called with great urgency for political reform. The high-profile and very personal slinging match between Wang Wen (王文), the head of the editorial desk at the Chinese-language Global Times, generally known for its nationalistic bent, and the liberal poet and essayist Ye Fu (野夫). The nasty (from the left) and very lopsided exchange between liberal scholar and CMP fellow Xiong Peiyun (熊培云) and a Party official at the University of International Business and Economics.

There is, of course, the detention and subsequent ritualistic attack on artist Ai Weiwei (艾未未), known as one of China’s most outspoken proponents of political reform. And the increased visibility of Li Shenming (李慎明), currently a vice-director at CASS and formerly secretary to Wang Zhen (王震), one of the so-called Eight Elders of the Chinese Communist Party, who has argued openly for the continued relevance of the “Stalinist model,” saying the critical reason for the collapse of both the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet Union was not the failure of Marxism or socialism, but the betrayal of these values and systems by Khrushchev and Gorbachev.

The “deep reds,” with their wistful talk of the glories of Mao Zedong, the “Four Basic Principles” and socialism with Chinese characteristics, seem to have been emboldened.

But how, and why?

While the hawks on the left seem to have greater visibility (and perhaps greater political pull) right now, they are only half the story. It takes two to tango, right?

We have seen interesting, even historic, shows of strength from the liberal right in recent weeks. The first of two recent examples, of course, was the essay from social critic Mao Yushi (茅于轼), which enumerated the various crimes of the CCP’s revolutionary leader, Mao Zedong, an act of criticism of historic proportions. The second was an editorial in the Party’s official People’s Daily that urged tolerance for “differing ideas” and seemed to be pointing at the grumbling powers on the left when it said the “hurling of epithets and the yanking of pigtails” is “fundamentally is a sign of weakness and narrow-mindedness.”

It must be noted that the People’s Daily editorial, which according to a well-placed source at People’s Daily Online was an independent effort by moderate journalists with senior-level blessing (not, as some have suggested, a cynical public relations ploy), has drawn fury from the left. During a recent speech on Marxist theory, Chen Kuiyuan, the very same man whose prominent place at the national meeting of propaganda ministers signaled tighter ideological controls on the media, said that “so-called ‘tolerance’ cannot become the ‘stealthy substitution of one thing for another’,” a clear reference to what he saw as the dangers of the kind of thinking expressed in the People’s Daily editorial. “If Marxism is stealthily substituted, and changed out slyly for ‘democratic socialism’, ‘neoliberalism’ or other such bourgeois thought systems,” said Chen, “the nature of our Party and our country will change.”

Last but not least, of course, we have Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝), who has stepped out on numerous occasions over the past year and harped on the need for political reform, most recently meeting with student leaders on the anniversary of the 1919 May Fourth Movement and on a diplomatic mission to Indonesia. And one of the most interesting (and perhaps revealing) rumors now going around in Party circles is that a deputy propaganda minister recently referred to Premier Wen as a “troublemaker.”

Therefore, as we watch China’s resurgent Maoist left, we have to recognize that the liberal right is acting with greater brazenness as well. This in fact is one important reason why we have seen so much of the left in recent months.

In the following piece, translated from the Chinese side of the China Elections and Governance website, the writer looks at the causes of these “fierce and furious responses” from China’s left. The piece provides excellent background on the current ideological rift playing out behind the scenes, where despite the outward grand narrative of a confident, exuberant and rising China, confidence is flagging.

This is make it or break it time. After three decades of reform, the big questions are now on the table.

As the intellectual Zhang Musheng (张木生) said recently on the launch of a new book that is making ripples inside the Party — more on that tomorrow — “The age of ‘avoiding debate” (不争论) has passed. We have drilled our way through ‘chaos’, and now a new age of ‘debate’ is upon us.”

Troops on Separate Paths Draw Their Swords: Where Does Chinese Society Go From Here?” (各路人马纷纷亮剑,中国社会何去何从)
Wan Jun (万军)
May 10, 2011

1.

Recently, vice-chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and secretary of the Party Leadership Group, Chen Kuiyuan (陈奎元), delivered a speech during the 2011 Work Meeting on Discipline Construction for the Study of Marxist Theory on the subject of “Having Faith in Marxism, Being a Firm Marxist” (信仰马克思主义,做坚定的马克思主义者). He pointed out in his speech that: “The theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics follows in one continuous line from Marxism, and is built on the foundation of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. It is not about the restringing of a musical instrument, or making a fresh start.” “So-called ‘tolerance’ (包容) cannot transform into ‘stealthy substitution of one thing for another’ (掉包),” [Chen said]. “If Marxism is stealthily substituted, and changed out slyly for ‘democratic socialism’ (民主社会主义), ‘neoliberalism’ (新自由主义) or other such bourgeois thought systems, the nature of our Party and our country will change. Therefore, so-called ‘tolerance’ can under no condition become stealthy substitution of one thing for another. We must not allow our very soul to be lost imperceptibly.” Clearly, this speech is like many speeches we have seen in the past two years, with statements like, “[We] resolutely will not allow the usurping of Party and state power under the banner of reform and opening,” or, “[We] resolutely oppose universal values,” etcetera. All of these are aimed at certain social phenomena, and they are quite pointed [in their criticisms].

Naturally, Chen Kuiyuan’s speech represents more than his personal viewpoint. He represents formidable powers. This causes us to recall the remarks of one high-level central Party leader at this year’s two meetings [of the NPC and CPPCC], who said, “In adhering to the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, the most important thing is to keep to the correct political direction. [We] must not waver on the basic [political] system of our nation and other major matters of principle. If we waver, not only will there be no building of socialist modernization to speak of, but the development gains we have already made will be lost, and the nation might even descend into an abyss of internal chaos.” [NOTE: This statement was made by Wu Bangguo (吴邦国), chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC and a senior politburo standing committee member]. He also said with great gravity that, “China will not do multi-party governance in succession, will not do diversity of guiding ideologies, will not do separation of powers or a bicameral system, will not do federalism, and will not do privatization.” With delirious delight, as though he had found a hidden treasure, Zhang Hongliang (张宏良), a Maoist Communist Party member and a professor at China University of Nationalities (Minzu University of China), used the biggest platform of the Maoist left, the Utopia website, to make a report lasting almost three hours, carrying out a comprehensive interpretation of the speech by this high-level leader.

[Zhang Hongliang] then said with utter confidence: “If the Chinese people want to rise without the banner of Mao Zedong, there is no way . . . We must believe that the era of Mao Zedong Thought is coming. We must prepare.” [He added], “Some people say we’re talking about cutting our country off from the world. Then let’s cut our country off from the rest of the world, I say! What’s so bad about that?” This all creates the impression that “a tide of revolution is coming.” When you link the words of these people together, when you line all of these characters up together, the conclusion that you come to us this — that if we want to continue holding high the banner of reform and opening, taking ourselves deeper into the tide of world civilization, the impediments to this are many indeed.

2.

What exactly is it that has stirred all of these people to make such fierce and furious responses? Please see the following materials, from which we can certainly find the answers we need.

February 27, 2010 — Wen Jiabao (温家宝) says during an online discussion with web users: “I’ve referred in the past to remarks made by Chairman Mao Zedong and Mr. Huang Yanpei (黄炎培) before the founding of the republic to resolve the problem of the periodic law (周期律) [of the successive changing of dynasties] and the fact that ‘the nation can fall as quickly as it rises’, [and I said] that the most important thing is democracy, and only with democracy can we ensure the we don’t [have the problem of] a man’s policy measures dying with him (人亡政息).”

June 2010 — Political reforms in Hong Kong come to an impasse, then suddenly there is a reversal, the central leadership accepts the political reform plan of the Democratic Party. Soon after, Adam Michnik, the former advisor to Lech Walesa of Poland’s independent trade union Solidarity paid a visit to China and had a forum with Chinese scholars. At the same time, the senior cadre Qin Xiao (秦晓) meets with People’s Liberation Army General Liu Yazhou (刘亚洲), the son-in-law of Li Xiannian (李先念) [and a well-known proponent of democracy], for talks on universal values.

August 21, 2010Wen Jiabao delivers a speech in Shenzhen called “Only By Adhering to Reform and Opening Does Our Country Have a Bright Future” (只有坚持改革开放,国家才有光明前途), in which he says: “Without the protection afforded by political reforms, we will lose the gains [we have made] through economic reforms, and our goal of modernization cannot be achieved . . . Stopping or moving back will not only spell and end to the fruits of 30 years of reform and opening and a precious development opportunity, sapping the vigor and vitality of socialism with Chinese characteristics, but it will go against the wishes of the people, and is ultimately a dead end.”

September 23, 2010 — Wen Jiabao accepts an interview with CNN anchor Fareed Zakaria, [and says]: “I believe that while moving ahead with economic reforms, we also need to advance political reforms, as our development is comprehensive in nature, our reform should also be comprehensive. I think the core of your question is about the development of democracy in China. I believe when it comes to the development of democracy in China, we talk about progress to be made in three areas: No. 1: We need to gradually improve the democratic election system so that state power will truly belong to the people and state power will be used to serve the people. No. 2: We need to improve the legal system, run the country according to law, and establish the country under the rule of law and we need to view an independent and just judicial system. No. 3: Government should be subject to oversight by the people and that will ask us, call on us to increase transparency in government affairs and particularly it is also necessary for government to accept oversight by the news media and other parties . . . And such a democracy first and foremost should serve to ensure people’s right to democratic elections, oversight and decision making. Such a democracy should also help people to fully develop themselves in an all-around way in an environment featuring freedom and equality. And such a democracy should be based on a full-fledged legal system. Otherwise, there would be chaos. That’s why we need to run the country according to law and ensure that everyone is equal under the law.” [NOTE: Above is not translated from the Chinese version, but taken directly from CNN's transcript of the interview.]

April 22, 2011 — Prosecutors in the Li Zhuang Case withdraw charges [against the defense lawyer Li Zhuang]. The so-called “Li Zhuang Lawyer’s Perjury Case” (李庄漏罪案) is a symbolic case in the city of Chongqing’s campaign against criminal elements and its turn toward “red culture” and propaganda. The withdrawal of the case has a ripple effect throughout society, doubts open up about [Bo Xilai's] “anti-crime drive” (打黑) and the “red singing” [campaign] appears desolate and ridiculous.

April 26, 2011 — Caixin Online, a media under the Party newspaper Zhejiang Daily, publishes an essay from the economist Mao Yushi (茅于轼) called “Returning Mao Zedong to Human Form” (把毛泽东还愿成人), which said: “Mao Zedong was not a god, and he must ultimately step down from the stage of godhood and become an ordinary man. Once he has been stripped of his cloak of divinity, and all of the superstitions surrounding him have vanished, he must be subjected to fair judgement.”

April 30, 2011 — The CCP’s newspaper organ the People’s Daily publishes an editorial called “Meeting ‘Diverse Thinking’ With a Tolerant Heart” (以包容心对待社会中“异质思维”) that says: “Only in the midst of competition will the value of ideas be shown, and only through practice can they be tested. ‘I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.’ This [quote from Voltaire] expresses a kind of openness, and even more a sense of confidence. The hurling of epithets and the yanking of pigtails, this way of thinking is fundamentally is a sign of weakness and narrow-mindedness, and it does not benefit the construction of social harmony or the creation of a healthy temperament.”

May 4, 2011Southern Metropolis Daily publishes “Wu Kangmin: The Premier Invited Me For ‘a Talk’” (吴康民:总理邀我“一晤”), and points out: when Wen Jiabao spoke about the difficulties facing mainland reforms, he mentioned two principal forces, the first the remnants of feudal society, the second is the evil legacy of the ‘Cultural Revolution.’ [NOTE: Ng Hong Mun is chairman of the Hong Kong delegation to the NPC.]

Look at the above materials and we understand only too clearly that these men have reacted so fiercely because reform elements within the Party have shouted again and again. Yes, China is in the midst of a fierce clash between different ideas, and this state of affairs has directly impacted political trends in China. These political trends concern the direction of economic development. At its most basic, this clash of ideas concerns the major question of what course the Chinese people should take.

3

This fierce clash of ideas exposes the crisis facing socialism with Chinese characteristics. The special characteristics theory was something raised by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s according to the new development demands of society. There were three basic sources. The first was the original doctrine of socialism, and this was evinced clearly in the raising of the banner of Marxism-Leninism, the adherence to single-party rule by the Chinese Communist Party, and a national economic system focusing on the state-run economic sector. The second source was Chinese culture. If the theory of special characteristics was to be rooted in the native country it must be permeated with Chinese cultural elements. In the old parlance, this was about “taking Marxism-Leninism and combining it with the concrete experiences of revolution in China.” Wherein lies the deepest truths about China? Not, I think, in its huge population, or in its clear differences with [countries] around the world. Rather, it lies in those things that manifest the spiritual core of the Chinese people. In understanding the world, the Chinese people have always begun with the yin and the yang — this is true of [understanding] nature, and it is true of [understanding] society. Linguistically, the Chinese people have two systems, the first real [or concrete] (实) and the other void [or fictitious] (虚). Behaviorally, there are also two systems, one yang ["explicit" or "positive"] (meaning clear principles) and the other yin ["implicit" or "negative"] (meaning the unrevealed principles). As these [cultural elements] appear in special characteristics theory, this means that a number of important and well-known wordings and formulations (提法) must be understood in the context of these systems. For example, “First let a few get rich,” but how? The premises are unclear, they are implicit, but the results are explicit, and they must rely on many principles (including many unspoken ones) in order to be achieved. 尽管后来有人匆匆忙忙予以阐述,但已很难改变人们固有的认识. Then there was [Deng Xiaoping's] so-called “Cat Theory” (猫论), “crossing the river by feeling the stones” (摸着石头过河), and all were perhaps this way — to understand them you must put them in the context and background of Chinese culture. The third [source of special characteristics theory] were various principles from capitalist market economies, but owing to theoretical needs, these principles were always referred to as principles of the “socialist market economy” (社会主义市场经济). It was this theory that over thirty years resulted in a soaring Chinese economy, with China becoming the world’s second largest economy and causing many people to shout: “China has risen!” At the same time, under the guidance of these theories [borrowed from capitalist market economies] the country has accumulated many thorny problems, such as a growing gap between rich and poor, which has already surpassed that of the world’s most developed capitalist countries. Mechanisms of self-governance and self monitoring [by the Party and government] have turned corruption into a great scourge, so that it has already become one of the countries most salient cultural characteristics. The power of citizens is continuously trampled under foot, and moral dust storms come blowing in one after another . . . All of this has covered the face of the theory of socialism with special characteristics with a layer of grey, and it faces a serious test.

Concerning the whole range of problems existing in society, the normal means would be to treat them surgically, ensuring that the nation operates in health. But the state system under the guidance of special characteristics theory has an extremely small capacity for correcting its errors. Take, for example, the ongoing food safety issues that concern all Chinese. Not only have they not been effectively checked, they’ve grown worse and worse. This shows us that this theory [of socialism with Chinese characteristics] is applicable only to a moment in time, and cannot be applied more broadly. It must exit the stage of history. But there are some who are terrified of this historical necessity, and they will stop at nothing to defend this theory. Their reasons are simple. They are the greatest beneficiaries of this theory. And of course, they represent a powerful force, and they have a foothold in political power, finance, trade, foreign relations, science and technology and other areas.

FURTHER READING: Southern Metropolis Daily article on Ng Hong Mun

南方都市报
May 3, 2011, A18

吴康民:总理邀我“一晤” 港区原全国人大代表吴康民向南都记者讲述前不久受温总理特邀做客中南海经历

南都记者 杨章怀 实习生 崔义刚 发自北京据媒体报道,香港特区原全国人大代表、培侨教育机构董事长吴康民日前在北京参加完清华大学百年校庆后,来到中南海与国务院总理温家宝畅谈一个半小时,温家宝夫妇宴请吴康民夫妇。在征得温总理同意后,吴康民在返港第二天,给香港媒体发了会见新闻稿和照片。4月28日,吴康民在接受南方都市报记者采访时表示,他就是跟总理拉家常,温总理对他这位香港老者十分尊重。

温总理亲笔信表示“甚思一晤”4月28日,85岁高龄的吴康民在电话里接受南都记者采访时,对5天前在中南海与温家宝见面时的情景历历在目。

吴康民回忆,他第一次见到温家宝总理是在8年前,2003年6月30日,温家宝在香港会见部分香港特区全国人大代表、全国政协委员,曾当选第四届至第十届全国人大代表的吴康民也在其中。

吴康民说,温总理向大家提起,当年两会期间,有香港记者问他“国务院谁分管港澳工作”,总理介绍完后,反问记者“你们还不知道吗”?事后,温总理看到了吴康民在香港媒体发表的一篇短文,大意是“香港地区的全国人大代表都不知道,香港记者怎么会知道?”温家宝说,看了吴康民的文章很有启发,并向大家道歉,还特意介绍时任国务委员的唐家璇给大家认识,“这位就是分管港澳工作的国务院官员”。

“第一次见面,温总理对我有了印象,还跟我握手。但十分短暂。”吴康民说。

吴康民有在报纸上写时政评论的习惯。2009年8月14日,温家宝总理给吴康民写了一封亲笔信,信中称:“香港报刊上有时看到您的一些短文和评论,那些鞭辟入里的分析和见解,给人以启示。”温总理还在信中说,“如来北京,可提前告之,甚思一晤,借聆教益。”几个月后,吴康民受邀到北京参加60年国庆庆典,他提前写信给中央政府驻香港联络办公室(简称“中联办”)负责人,请其转告总理。但温总理国庆期间太忙,国庆后又要出国访问,没能抽空与吴康民见面。

去年10月,吴康民来到北京,当时正在召开中共十七届五中全会,全会结束后,温总理又要出国访问,再次未能见面。

今年新年过后,温总理给吴康民写信称,两次见面落空,希望今年春暖花开时到北京见面。

吴康民接到清华大学百年校庆的邀请函,就将要去北京的消息通过中联办转告总理。一个多星期后,中联办有了回信,总理定于4月24日上午10点与他见面,后又调整为4月23日。

“上下楼时总理一手扶着扶梯,一手搀扶着我”吴康民到北京后,通过中联办在北京的负责人与总理办公室取得联系。见面前一天,吴康民接到总理的口信,说要单独见吴康民,中午请他吃饭,到时可以让吴夫人也来。

4月23日9时15分,中联办的小轿车来到吴康民下榻的宾馆将他接走。吴康民特意穿了身西装,穿着浅蓝色衬衣,系着领带、穿着皮鞋。

进入中南海,汽车直接开到总理的办公室楼下。温总理已经在台阶下迎接。简短的寒暄过后,总理搀扶着吴康民进屋。眼前的总理穿着十分朴素:黑色夹克衫、深蓝色裤子,脚穿布鞋。“我上下楼时,总理一手扶着扶梯,一手搀扶着我。”吴康民回忆当时的情景仍十分感动。

总理先是带吴康民参观,其中一个小会议室只能坐4-8人;稍大一点的会议室可以坐几十个人。总理办公室在二楼,据吴康民目测,只有12平方米左右,一个大办公桌十分显眼。办公室里摆着沙发,还有一些朋友、国际友人的照片。

在吴康民的印象中,温总理办公环境比较朴素,“没有豪华的设备,桌子都是很旧,给人朴素稳重的感觉,没有缤纷艳丽的色彩。”总理书房摆放着观看广州居民下棋照片总理的书房在一楼,靠墙是一排褐色的书柜,书柜中整齐地摆满了书籍。从吴康民提供的与总理的合影可以看到,温总理书柜里有《二十四史》、《辞海》、《现代经济辞典》、《中外历史名人传记》、《中外历史名人之谜》、德国作者卡尔·雅斯贝尔斯的《大哲学家》等书籍。书柜里还摆放着总理的一些照片,其中一幅是身穿白衬衣的温家宝俯身看居民下棋的场景。这张照片拍摄于2005年温总理围绕研究制定“十一五”规划在广东考察期间,当年9月11日下午,温总理来到广州逢源街看望居民、了解居民的生活情况。当总理俯身观看居民下棋时,这个瞬间被定格下来。

交谈气氛十分轻松,没有旁人在场温总理与吴康民交谈的地点就在书房,两人坐在直角型的沙发两旁。“气氛十分轻松,一人一杯茶。交谈没有提前设置议题,没有记录,两人都没有准备书面材料,也没有旁人在场”。吴康民说,开始是聊家庭,温总理介绍说,他父母健在,年纪很大了。温总理还提到年轻时候生活艰难,念大学后,到地方去考察地形,做一些工程技术工作,后调到地质矿产部,1985年任中央办公厅副主任后,就一直在中南海工作。

温总理也看了事先吴康民提交的个人简历,对一直在香港从事教育工作的吴康民比较了解。吴康民随后提到内地造假的情况严重,毒牛奶、假鸡蛋、假文凭、假论文等,认为是对年轻人道德教育不足所致。吴康民说,本准备与总理深入交流道德教育的看法,但“时间太紧了,没有展开”。

吴康民说,温总理提及内地的改革所遇到的困难时说,主要是两股势力,一股是中国封建社会所残余的;另一种则是“文革”遗毒,两股势力影响了人们不敢讲真话,喜欢讲大话,社会风气不好,应该努力纠正。

谈及香港问题时,吴康民主动说,4月11日他在香港媒体发表了一篇《谁能“维稳”,便是“真命天子”》的文章,认为目前香港必须维持社会稳定,反对暴力和暴戾的行为和叫嚣,能维持今后香港稳定的能人,便是下届行政长官的理想人选。温总理点了点头说,“看过这篇文章”。

“我在文章中也没有肯定任何一位热门候选人,温总理更没有和我进一步讨论有关候选人的问题。”吴康民随后邀请温总理再次到香港访问,总理说还需“国务院港澳办安排”。

午餐吃得很简单,总理夫人陪同11时30分,总理起身领着吴康民去离书房不远的小餐厅。当他们来到餐厅时,吴康民夫人、温总理夫人张培莉都准时跟他们会合。没有刻意化妆的总理夫人显得很有气质:齐耳短发,系着橘红色的围巾,穿着粉色花纹的西服外套,黑色裤子。

“餐厅很宽敞,大概有30-40平方米,白色纱窗、一张大圆桌,铺着红色的桌布,四把旧式的椅子,唯一与普通餐馆包间不同的是,窗户底下立着一面国旗。”吴康民说。

温总理靠着窗户坐下,吴康民在总理的右边,总理夫人张培莉在总理的左边,吴夫人则与总理面对而坐。席间,总理夫人说话较少,大部分时间是微笑着听温总理和吴康民两人的交谈。

午饭吃得很简单。每人一杯茶、半杯红酒、烧饼、蔬菜、点心、鸡肉和一碗汤。

午饭开始时,四人先碰杯,喝了口红酒,边吃边聊。主要聊家里的事情,吴康民说虎年添了个孙子,总理也聊了些他孙子的事。

半个多小时的午餐结束后,温总理赠给吴康民一本紫光阁藏画影印画册,并亲笔签名。吴康民则送给总理一张他近期获授香港教育学院荣誉院士的照片和一本政治评论集。

午饭后,温总理带着吴康民参观紫光阁,还向他介绍了周恩来总理生前办公的地方。两人边谈边散步,大约5分钟后,总理夫妇将吴康民夫妇送上汽车,并挥手告别。

以文会友

结识总理

吴康民说,以前经常看到总理对老者十分尊重的新闻,这次亲身经历了总理的亲民,切身感受到平民总理对人亲切的态度。总理举手投足间,都流露出对长者的尊敬,令吴康民印象颇深。

回到香港后,在征得总理同意的情况下,吴康民给香港媒体发了与总理见面的新闻稿和照片,被许多媒体关注。如今,吴康民仍被当地媒体和国外媒体追逐,“他们总想问我和总理聊了哪些秘密。我告诉他们这些后,记者朋友们总不满足,以为我隐瞒了什么。”吴康民说,此次会见并无既定议题,也并无向我征求对内地和香港社会政治情况的意见,偶有触及,都是闲聊,并无深入讨论,“温总理也没有想通过我散播什么信息,总的印象是一种有益的交谈,亲切的慰问,他对60多年在香港从事爱国活动的长者表示敬意。”吴康民说,这一次跟总理接触,缘于他经常在媒体上发表文章,他在香港通过“以文交友”的方式,结识了很多有名望的知识分子。“总理说看到我的文章,令我喜出望外,以文章来结交老朋友,我很感动。”吴康民表示,今后将一如既往地在媒体发表时评文章,“但不敢惊动总理,总理确实太忙了。”

14 Comments to “Why China’s left is up in arms”

  1. dae says:

    For once let’s not be cynical and take things at face value. The opening up and reform movement initiated by Deng unleashed capitalist, market forces in China. This had a duel impact. It led to an immense transformation of the Chinese economy in terms of modernization and the emergence of a new bourgeoisie (who buys all the cars and goes on foreign tours if not the new Middle Class), but the capitalist reforms have also led to an immense increase in social ills, such as burgeoning income inequality, a disparity in access to social services, an increase in corruption, exploitative labor relations, etc.. While some have gotten rich many others have seen life get more difficult.

    The representatives of the new bourgeoisie, both inside and outside the CPC, want to see an acceleration in the political reform process ultimately leading to the liquidation of the CPC as we know it and the implementation of a western style multi-party, parliamentary political system that adheres to “universal values”, a code word for western concepts of “human rights.” The ultimate aim of this policy is to create a neo-liberal, social democratic, political and economic system in China. Of course under that sort of regime China could veer off to the right as has occurred in some of the former Soviet bloc countries in eastern Europe. There would then even be the chance of the KMT resurfacing and gaining political power. The above is the logical extension of the liberal position and I think this scenario is well understood by the Maoists.

    On the other hand the Maoist rise to power could well be based on a tea-party-like populist rebellion. Not a “Jasmine Revolution.” The Arab Spring is more in line with the liberal vision outlined above. The populist reaction to the neo-liberal program in China is more likely to be a Cultural Revolution redux. But the Maoists don’t want to see the country revert back to the chaos of the GPCR, they are thrilled that China is now an incipient superpower. They want to use the populist movement to gain and maintain political power. This can best be accomplished by using China’s new resources to bribe the working class and peasantry with New Deal like policies. I see the Maoists wanting to implement a social contract similar to what the U.S. had throughout the 1950s and 1960s, thus the push for subsidized housing for the poor, tuition support for students, establishment of a social security and a national health care system, reform of migrant residential rights, a call for an end to illegal demolitions, union reforms and the introduction of collective bargaining to quell labor unrest, etc. Many of these initiatives are still incipient but the Maoists would be smart to get on the social contract band-wagon to consolidate their power base.

    For all their rhetoric of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of thought, etc. the neo-liberals basically want to use these freedoms to gain political power and dismantle the PRC. If they ever gained power it’s pretty obvious their first order of business would be to try to totally discredit the CPC and Mao as Mao Yushi has demonstrated. The Maoists on the other hand want to maintain ideological and political hegemony and play up populist nostalgia for the positive aspects of the Mao era, social homogeneity, egalitarianism, iron rice bowl social benefits, esprit de corps, etc. which in retrospect, through the mists of time have become a rarefied vision of a lost innocence, i.e. a golden age. Hence the resurgence of the Mao cult in rural areas and amongst the lower social strata.

    So the ideological struggle in the CPC is reflective of real class disparities in China (or in Marxist rhetoric class struggle). While the politicians on the left (Maoists) and the right (Neo-liberals) may be opportunists and charlatans, aren’t all politicians, be they in China or the US? Nevertheless their differing political stances do reflect differing alignments of underlying social formations.

  2. JVO says:

    Yeah I agree with Julen. I think the Maoist “renaissance” is just window dressing to cover up deepening income inequality and social tensions.

  3. Lee says:

    The author’s left/right labeling is anachronistic. Also the People’s Daily editorial’s claim that Marxism and democratic socialism are two different things is ridiculous, as is their claim that democratic socialism is bourgeois. Bourgeoisie own companies and engage in wage slavery. Under democratic socialism workers own and probably manage their own companies based on the widely proven cooperative model. Marx didn’t prescribe the features of socialism, he described the features of capitalism. There’s no indication he would approve of Lenin’s inversion of the soviet system to a top down-authoritarian one. Classical, proper Socialists believe in democracy and social equality. Leninists and Stalinists believe in using socialist propaganda as a component of an authoritarian regime. This form of government is not democracy but hypocrisy. Who cares if it can find a way to carry on. Any country with such a wealth disparity can’t call itself socialist. The point of socialism is to remove exploiters at the top of society who are responsible for the exploitation, oppression, and most of the environmental degradation. You can’t call these technocrats members of the ‘left.’ They are the enemy. The Chongqing red culture drive is a way of confusing people who are reaching the right conditions for socialist action as to what socialism is and who’s side their enemies are on.

  4. Julen says:

    @David – Sorry I take so long to come back, been travelling these days. Just wanted to clarify: when I say “optimistic”, I wasn’t thinking optimistic in terms of who will win the debate, but in terms of there being a meaningful debate at all. Meaningful in the sense of having an impact on the policy of the coming years.

    You are right, though, that Bo’s politics do have real consequences in Chongqing, but the explanation could be simply that Bo is just using Chongqing for his personal campaign purposes. I am just guessing here of course, but it just makes sense: why would any CP leader want to risk radical change now that all is running so sweetly (not for all the people, sure, but indeed very sweetly for the CP leaders themselves!)

    Essentially what I wanted to say is the same as Kendall writes below me – perhaps he has expressed it more clearly. It’s been the same for a few years already, Wen and Hu say some nice things, and then Wu and Zhou say some other things, and every time the policy shows few signs of change in either direction.

  5. Wendall Kendall says:

    There are a few problems with all of this speculation on ideological rifts in the party. First of all, they may or may not exist. For all WJB’s rhetoric on CNN and elsewhere, he has yet to put his money where his mouth is. And although Bo Xilai’s revival of Maoism is pretty horrifying, what does it mean for policy? Certainly it entails putting party unity ahead of all else, turning back from rule of law, crushing dissidents… but what about the economy and social welfare? Just because a handful of prominent politicians have paid lip service to liberalization or maoism/conservativism (take your pick) doesn’t mean that two distinct camps, each with distinct policy preferences, exist. We shouldn’t be too quick to take rhetoric at face value. While these alleged ideological rifts might widen in the future, I think that come 2012, the new boss will be much like the old boss.

  6. admin says:

    King Tubby:

    Yeah, no wonder Victor Shih has a gazillion Twitter followers.

  7. King Tubby says:

    And while he is not the most prolific, Victor Shih leaves all sites in the dust.

  8. King Tubby says:

    David

    Every site comes with its own rusted on troll.

    Th price of providing a serious read, and CMP has been excelling itself of late.

    I’m still betting half the farm on the Bo narrative.

    Do you have a view??????

  9. David says:

    Julen:

    I just realized I said “run up to 2010″ in my last comment to you. Of course that’s “run up to 2012.” As Itlee can testify, brain hiccups mount when one is doing too much all at once!

    Best,
    David

  10. David says:

    Itlee:

    You poor lost soul . . . :) I feel like you deserve a special prize for persistence at the CMP website.

    Thanks for catching that critical error. Your presence is much appreciated. Yes, Wu Kangmin (Ng Hong Mun).

    Let me help you out by posting the SMD editorial mentioned . . .

    Best,
    David

  11. ltlee says:

    @David

    吴建民???

  12. King Tubby says:

    These ideological types and their sock puppets can joust all they want into 2012 and beyond, but they are sort of missing a number of major reality checks taking place right now. Major Yantze sedimentation problems, totally exhausted aquifers, a failing power grid, environmental contamination, etc.

    Note that Wen and Hu are well and truly distancing themselves for the Three Gorges and it outcomes.
    Lack of potable water, contaminated food. Someone or class will be for the high jump probably sooner than later, but it won’t be the architects of this meltdown. Object lesson for China. Never again hand political power to engineers.

    Nothing like a country mired in arcane ideologies and the past. Not sure of the concensus among other commenters, but I think that the retro/faux Maoism thread will win the day: a sure sign of a sclerotic political order whose arc is about to return to earth.

  13. David says:

    Julen:

    Begging your pardon, but you’ve misread me here.

    I haven’t said anything that could be construed as optimistic, pessimistic or otherwise. Let’s suppose A is playing B in the World Cup final, and I say: “A is playing B in the World Cup final.” Would you call me optimistic? That makes no sense. I’m simply making a statement about how a match is lining up, and telling you who the forwards and defenders are.

    Of course, if Brazil was playing England in the World Cup Final, and I said, “England will defeat Brazil in the World Cup final,” you might call me optimistic. Or pessimistic making the opposite prediction.

    And Julen, OF COURSE what we are seeing is “a reflection” in part of the internal struggle for power in the run up to 2010. But why do you say “just a reflection”? And yes, OF COURSE many leaders are pragmatic and “not ideological” as you say — but the outcome of the ideological debate (which, again, I’m not predicting) has real pragmatic consequences. That is to say, WHOSE brand of pragmatism toward WHAT ends? You’re supposing pragmatism implies some sort of consensus. You and I can both be pragmatists, yet disagree with very real consequences. Even if one argues that Bo Xilai is fundamentally pragmatic, you have to face the fact that there are very real challenges, for example, to rule of law in Chongqing.

    Whatever PEW surveys say — and there are a lot of reasons to shrug them off on China — the idea that things are “working well” in a sustainable sense is not a generally accepted fact, not on either side of the aisle. The NPC this year showed us that quite clearly with the almost desperate focus on 民生 issues.

    Best,
    David

  14. Julen says:

    “This is make it or break it time. After three decades of reform, the big questions are now on the table.”

    Great article and translation. But honestly, I think you are a bit too optimistic, all this we are seeing is probably just a reflection of internal struggle for power in the run up to 2012. As soon as the seats are assigned and the match is settled, these “debates” will die out and the leaders will go on with their business. They are not ideological driven leaders, but mostly pragmatic.

    Looking at it from a different angle: if somethings works well, why on earth would they want to change it? China is still growing at amazing speed, the PEW surveys show high levels of satisfaction, the miracle is still in full force. I don’t believe for a second that Bo and the others want to return to Maoist politics in any meaningful way. They want maintain the status quo, and increase their own power, that’s all.

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