On May 14, the Party’s official People’s Daily newspaper ran a full page of coverage of political reform, generally referred to in China as “political system reforms”, or zhengzhi tizhi gaige (政治体制改革). That’s zhenggai (政改) for short.

In terms of breadth and boldness, the People’s Daily series is nothing to write home about. Most of the language is a song of self congratulation from China’s leaders about the progress they say they have already made on political reform.

On issues many would regard as fundamental to substantive and meaningful political reform, the People’s Daily series seems to shut the door. It says quite explicitly, for example, that “the leadership of the Party must be upheld”:

In actively and steadily promoting political reform we must uphold the fundamental political system and basic economic system of our country. We must uphold as one the three [principles of] the leadership of the Party, the people as masters of their own country (人民当家作主), and governing of the country by rule of law.

The obvious problem — arguably the crux of reform itself — is the clear conflict between the first priority, the firm commitment to the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, and the second and third priorities. Can there really be rule of law if Party leaders can manipulate the courts? And how is the mastery of the public to be exercised?

Hong Huang (洪晃), one of China’s most recognized media personalities and the publisher of iLook fashion magazine (with more than 4.7 million Sina Weibo followers), wrote in response:

Hmm. If there is no independent judiciary, it doesn’t matter how you reform, everything just ensures power and checks rights; it won’t protect rights and check power.
嗯，没有独立司法，不管怎么改，都只是保障权力，制约权利；不会是保障权利，制约权力。

Ren Zhiqiang (任志强), a well-known property developer with just under eight million followers on Sina Weibo, responded to Hung by adding:

The first step in political reform is separation of the Party and the government.
政治体制首先在党政分家。

A Shenzhen-based user scoffed at the reforms as treated by the People’s Daily:

Without separation of powers, how can [the Party] check [power]? Is it going to check itself? What a joke!
不三权分立，怎么制约？自己约束自己？笑话！

But the People’s Daily series was quite explicit in saying that China would “resolutely not imitate Western political forms”:

. . . [We] resolutely will not imitate Western political forms. Only by respecting [our country's] national circumstances, and by proceeding step-by-step in an orderly way, will we be able to create new Chinese miracles, constantly reaping new self-confidence for our people.

That, it seems, would rule out separation of powers.

The one noteworthy phrase that stuck out in the People’s Daily series was “Preserving rights, checking power” (保障权利，制约权力). As CMP Director Qian Gang (钱钢) noted, this phrase, combining “preserving rights” and “checking power”, has appeared in just four articles in the People’s Daily since 2000, the last mention being in February 2010.

The prominent play given to the phrase in the May 14 series suggests that China’s leaders may be grooming it as a new political catchphrase. Look in particular at how the phrase is emphasized in the layout of the political reform page.

The grey squares at left and right on the page read, respectively, “preserving rights” and “checking power.”

We can possibly expect to see much more of this phrase as we approach the 18th Party Congress. But of course the substance of how these two principles might be achieved in practice is another matter entirely. And for now, at least, the People’s Daily offers no answers.

———-

THE FOLLOWING IS THE FULL TEXT OF THE MAY 14 PEOPLE’S DAILY SERIES ON POLITICAL REFORM:

本报北京5月13日电（记者黄庆畅）改革开放以来，特别是党的十六大以来，我国积极稳妥推进政治体制改革，取得重大进展。

人民民主权利得到充分保障。2004年“国家尊重和保护人权”写入我国宪法；2010年3月选举法修改，明确实行城乡按相同人口比例选举全国人大代表；到2010年底，我国形成了中国特色社会主义法律体系，这些都体现了我国充分保障人民民主权利的进程。2008年12月，中共中央转发《中央政法委员会关于深化司法体制和工作机制改革若干问题的意见》，提出60项改革任务，到今年上半年，司法体制机制改革取得重要阶段性成果。

基层群众自治健康发展。党的十七大报告把“基层群众自治制度”作为中国特色社会主义政治发展道路的重要内容，基层民主自治体系日趋完善。2010年，村民委员会组织法修改，确立了村务监督委员会制度，使民主选举、民主决策、民主管理、民主监督落到了实处。

人民有序政治参与热情高涨。为进一步扩大人民有序政治参与，我国确立了以政务公开打造“阳光政府”的思路，2008年颁布实施政府信息公开条例，各级人大“开门立法”、政府部门召开公共事务听证会成为常态，“三公经费”逐步公开，“网络问政”蓬勃发展，人民群众的知情权、参与权、表达权和监督权得以充分保障，人民实现了内容广泛的当家作主。

政府运行快步走向法制化规范化。党的十六大以来，我国先后于2003年和2008年集中进行了两次行政管理体制改革。国务院经过5次清理，共取消和调整行政审批事项2183项。行政复议和行政诉讼制度建设，让“民告官”成为现实；政府信息公开条例的实施，让政府逐渐适应在老百姓的监督下工作；领导干部和行政执法过错责任追究，给权力戴上了“紧箍咒”。2006年公务员法实施以来，全国有超过24万人通过竞争上岗走上了领导岗位，目前中央机关公开遴选公务员已由“试水”阶段转入正式实施阶段。

政治体制改革稳步推进（深化改革攻坚克难）

郑志文

积极稳妥推进政治体制改革，发展社会主义民主政治，是党和国家始终不渝的奋斗目标。改革开放以来，政治体制改革作为我国全面改革的重要组成部分，始终随着经济社会的发展不断深化，始终随着人民政治参与热情的提高不断深化，始终随着时代进步的潮流不断深化。

从党的领导体制逐步规范化、制度化，到以党内民主带动人民民主的实践；从大刀阔斧地推进机构改革，到建设、完善适应社会主义市场经济的行政管理体制；从废除领导干部职务终身制，到建立国家公务员制度；从实行基层群众自治，到实行城乡按相同人口比例选举人大代表、扩大公民有序政治参与；从加强对权力运行的监督和制约，到建立和完善惩治与预防腐败体系……政治体制改革的不断推进，激发了全党全国各族人民的创造性、积极性和主动性，保持了党和国家活力，扩大了社会主义民主，健全了社会主义法制，促进了我国人权事业进步，促进了经济、政治、文化、社会的全面协调发展，为社会主义现代化事业提供了制度支撑和法治保障。

社会主义民主政治切实保障了人民当家作主的权利，同时又充分显示出最大限度地集中社会资源办大事的优越性。短短30多年时间，我国经济和社会发生了翻天覆地的变化，一跃成为世界第二大经济体，成为国际舞台上有影响力的大国，外界赞叹的“中国速度”、“中国奇迹”，正是中国特色社会主义政治发展道路强大影响力和生命力的生动证明，也是我国政治体制强大生命力和影响力的生动证明。

如果说“权力”和“权利”是民主政治的一体两面，那么近十年来，在政治体制改革的进程中，前者的被“监督制约”和后者的“充分保障”恰成鲜明对比，勾勒出政治体制改革的总体脉络。“制约权力”与“保障权利”的共同之处，在于保证人民当家作主，增强党和国家活力，调动人民积极性。

“制约权力”是指对公权力的监督制约。近十年来，一系列法律法规和规章制度的出台，从实体和程序两个方面，为公权力的运行提供制度框架、划定运行轨道。同时，依法治国、依法行政理念的不断深入人心、不断贯彻实施，也使“限权”成为政治体制改革的目标和出发点。

“保障权利”则是对公民权利的尊重和充实。一方面，人权事业不断推进，公民自身的财产安全和人身权利得到了更加完善的保护；另一方面，随着经济社会的发展，人民的知情权、参与权、表达权、监督权也得到了提升和保障，并以此为推动力，促进了立法、决策的科学化、民主化，成为广大人民依法行使参与管理国家、社会事务权利的重要抓手。

社会主义民主政治是一个吐故纳新的生命体，积极稳妥推进政治体制改革，必须坚持我国根本政治制度和基本经济制度，必须坚持党的领导、人民当家作主、依法治国三者的统一，绝不照搬西方政治模式。只有尊重国情、循序渐进，我们才能不断创造新的中国奇迹，不断收获新的民族自信。

基层群众自治：“三委”并行（深化改革攻坚克难）

“以前是群众怕村干部干事，现在是怕村干部不干事”。这是浙江武义县白洋街道后陈村村民的真实感受。

后陈村位于城乡结合部。过去，由于村务管理不透明，重大决策不民主，一度造成村内矛盾重重，干群关系紧张，村民上访不断。2004年6月18日，后陈村在海选村委会的基础上，建立了全国第一个村级民主监督组织，由群众选举产生村务监督委员会，与村党支部、村委会一起称为“三委会”。村务监督特别是村级财务监督由监委会负责。

随着监委会的成立，后陈村开始了脱胎换骨的变化，不仅村固定收入逐年增加，而且村干部连续8年实现“零违纪”，村民连续8年实现“零上访”。村监委会成立至今，村两委已经顺利完成了3次换届。最近的一次换届，村两委成员一个没动，全部高票当选，一次通过。

目前，浙江省3万多个行政村，村村建立了村务监督委员会，实现了村级监督组织“全覆盖”。2010年，村务监督委员会这一制度创新被写进村民委员会组织法，开始在全国推行。

点评：基层群众自治是社会主义民主的直接体现，是当代中国最直接、最广泛的民主实践。它通过以村民自治为核心的农村基层民主和以居民自治为核心的城市基层民主，将人民民主渗透到社会生活的各个方面。

从一村一地的摸索试验，到全国范围的推广实施，以基层群众自治制度为代表的基层民主建设已经在我国遍地开花，每年的村（居）委会“海选”成为中国民主政治发展的特殊风景。而随着村民委员会组织法等法律和制度的建立和完善，我国的基层群众自治日益成熟和规范。今天，基层群众自治制度已经成为中国特色社会主义民主政治的重要支柱。

全国人大代表选举，实行城乡“同票同权”（深化改革攻坚克难）

康厚明是一位进城务工农民，他和朱雪芹、胡小燕一起，都因为“农民工”的身份当选为十一届全国人民代表大会代表，引起了很多人的关注。在今年3月份的全国两会上，康厚明看到“城乡按相同人口比例选举人大代表”的规定，高兴地说，这是社会主义民主进程的重大进步！

今年3月14日，十一届全国人大第五次会议通过了《关于十二届全国人大代表名额和选举问题的决定》，规定十二届全国人大的代表将实行城乡按相同人口比例选举，按城乡约每67万人分配1名名额。据介绍，每67万人分配1名，是根据第六次全国人口普查数和2010年年底公安部公布的户籍人口数加权平均后作出的规定。

从1953年我国第一部选举法公布实施起到1995年之前，我国农村与城镇每一人大代表所代表的人口比例为8∶1。1995年，全国人大常委会修改选举法，将这一比例调整为4∶1。至2009年，城镇人口比重已达到46.6%。在这一背景下，“城乡同比”原则被明确下来。从8∶1到4∶1到1∶1，人们常说的“同票同权”在国家权力机关组成人员的选举中得以实现。

点评：人民代表大会制度是我国的根本政治制度，对这一制度加以不断地修改完善，是我国政治体制改革的重要组成部分。实行城乡按相同人口比例选举人大代表，体现了实事求是、与时俱进的精神。如果说1953年8∶1的比例规定有助于保证工人阶级在各级人大代表中占相对多数，那么如今城乡“同票同权”，意味着随着我国城镇人口比重的变化，农村人口在选举及政治权利的实现上向宪法规定的平等原则迈出了实质性的一步。这一规定让农民代表的名额得到了制度保障，有助于营造更加公平和谐的社会环境。

开门立法有效体现公正性普惠性（深化改革攻坚克难）

2011年10月26日下午，《家用汽车产品修理、更换、退货责任规定》立法听证会在国家质检总局会议室举行。

“很幸运能被选到参与此次听证会，我将要说的每一句话都代表的是民声民意啊。”四川成都消费者代表张义说，“我在网上发帖、走访朋友、同事，和他们一起深入探讨研究《规定》条文，最终搜集归纳了12条建议和意见。”

除张义这样的消费者代表外，还有汽车生产厂商代表、经销商代表等以及质检总局法规司、质量司等部门的领导或工作人员，会议室中座无虚席。

“对于高昂的检测费用，应建立统一的基金，由汽车厂家交纳保证金。”“亟待设立独立的第三方鉴定机构。”在3个多小时里，代表们或从自己的维权经历，或从自身工作实际出发，逐条对《规定》提出疑问和改进建议。

代表纷纷表示，汽车“三包”立法是一个较为复杂的问题，听证会让多方意见有了交流的平台，必将对汽车“三包”规定的出台产生积极影响。

点评：法律是人民意志的体现。近年来，全国各地都在积极推行“开门立法”，拓展了百姓参与立法的渠道，激发了群众的积极性，不仅可以弥补或修正法律法规的不足或不当之处，而且改变以往“部门立法”所造成的立法部门化、部门利益化、利益法律化等现象，从而更好地实现法律法规的公正性和普惠性。

同时，“开门立法”也是一次政府与群众之间的互动，可以让政府更多更深地了解社情民意，使社情民意成为政府工作的导向；而尊重民意的政府工作也必定会在群众的热情参与中得到顺利的开展，实现最大的社会效益。

信息公开从“三公经费”切入（深化改革攻坚克难）

公开信息是政府的义务，申请政府信息公开是公民的权利。本着这样的想法，广东东莞市民梁杰将该市社保局告上了法庭，原因是他索要社保详细账单未果。

梁杰的底气，来自2008年5月1日正式实施的《政府信息公开条例》，其中明确规定：公民、法人或者其他组织还可以根据自身生产、生活、科研等特殊需要，向国务院部门、地方各级人民政府及县级以上地方人民政府部门申请获取相关政府信息。

政府信息公开，是我国政务公开的一个重要方面。近年来，各级政府的各项工作内容及进程都会及时公开，公民可以通过特定途径，如政务公开栏、政务公开网络等进行查询、监督。

“三公经费”公开，无疑是近年来老百姓最为关切的话题，也是政务公开的重要内容。2011年4月24日，科技部在财政拨款支出说明中率先以文字形式公布“三公经费”预算。此后，中央各部委纷纷效仿。

点评：“公开为原则，不公开为例外。”随着《政府信息公开条例》的实施，我国政府信息公开的工作机制不断完善，制度体系逐步健全，公开范围逐渐扩大，公开载体更加丰富。以信息公开为重点的政务公开，实现了政府更为直接地面对公众，公众更为清晰地了解政府的目标，不但让老百姓的知情权、参与权、表达权、监督权得以落实，也使建设“阳光政府”、“廉洁政府”、“高效政府”的步伐大大加快。

转变政府职能从行政审批制度改革突破（深化改革攻坚克难）

过去，办理项目开工手续一般需要一年以上，现在缩短到100天以内就可以完全办结。海南省设立了省政府政务服务中心，推行行政审批“三集中”（审批事项、审批权力、审批人员）的改革，行政审批的效率明显提高。

姚云亭是海南省杨浦开发区某工程项目的负责人，多年从事工程项目的报批工作。与以往不同的是，如今他在项目报批的过程中，“再也不必拿着一堆报批材料，今天去这个局、明天再去那个厅，需要在省一级审批的，直接把材料交到政务中心的窗口就行了，时间能节省一半。”姚云亭说。

自2008年以来，海南省在各厅局设立专门的行政审批办公室，将原来分散在各分管领导和业务处室的审批权力全部向该办公室集中，行政审批办公室及其工作人员成建制进驻中心，办公室主任就是首席代表。由此，将所有的审批要素集中于政务服务中心，成功解决了以往审批“久拖不决”的现象。

通过改革，34个政府部门的1240项行政审批事项先后进驻中心，中心还对每个审批项目编制办事指南，制订示范文本。

点评：行政审批制度改革，是我国行政管理制度改革的继续和深入，其根本在于，突破传统计划经济观念的束缚，增强社会主义市场经济的意识；突破部门既得利益的束缚，增强改革大局的意识；突破“官本位”思想的束缚，增强服务为先的意识。

近10年来，国务院部门经过5次清理，共取消和调整行政审批事项2183项，占原有总数的60.6%；各省、自治区、直辖市本级共取消和调整行政审批事项36986项，占原有总数的68.2%。行政审批制度改革已经成为转变政府职能、推进社会进步的重要突破口。

公务员管理机制日益规范（深化改革攻坚克难）

今年是我国公务员制度建立的第十九个年头，《公务员法》正式实施也已经6年了。

以《公务员法》为基础，我国已制定颁布了行政机关公务员处分条例，出台了公务员职务与级别、录用、考核、奖励、培训、调任、辞退、申诉等18个配套法规及9部专项处分规章。

在进入机制方面，坚持凡进必考，依法、科学、公平考录。2003年以来，全国共考试录用123万名公务员，2011年录用人数达到17万人。目前，中央机关和省级机关录用公务员，除部分特殊职位外，均从具有两年以上基层工作经历的人员中考录，并建立健全从村（居）党支部书记、大学生村官和工人、农民等基层一线人员中考录公务员制度。

在选任机制方面，大力推行竞争性选拔方式。《公务员法》实施以来全国有超过24万人通过竞争上岗走上了领导岗位，还开展了公开遴选公务员试点。

在激励机制方面，坚持定期奖励和及时奖励相结合。《公务员法》实施以来全国共对255万人次进行了嘉奖、对59万人次记了三等功、对5万人次记了二等功和一等功。

在退出机制方面，进一步规范和畅通了公务员队伍的“出口”，通过调出、退休、辞去公职、辞退、开除等方式，一大批公务员退出了公务员队伍。

点评：党的十六大以来，特别是《公务员法》正式实施的6年来，中国特色公务员法律法规体系基本形成，公务员管理机制日益健全，公务员的素质、能力和作风建设全面加强，公务员制度法制化规范化建设不断推进。实践证明：公务员制度从我国国情出发，与中国特色社会主义政治制度相适应，充分体现和反映了我国政治体制的特点和要求，具有十分鲜明的中国特色。

党的十六大以来政治体制改革大事记（深化改革攻坚克难）

2002年11月，党的十六大提出，必须在坚持四项基本原则的前提下，继续积极稳妥地推进政治体制改革，扩大社会主义民主，健全社会主义法制，建设社会主义法治国家，巩固和发展民主团结、生动活泼、安定和谐的政治局面。

2004年3月14日，十届全国人大二次会议通过《中华人民共和国宪法修正案》，“国家尊重和保障人权”写入宪法。

2004年3月22日，国务院印发《全面推进依法行政实施纲要》，提出经过十年左右坚持不懈的努力，基本实现建设法治政府的目标。

2004年9月9日，中共十六届四中全会审议通过《中共中央关于加强党的执政能力建设的决定》，提出要把我们党建设成为科学执政、民主执政、依法执政的执政党。

2005年4月27日，十届全国人大常委会第十五次会议通过《中华人民共和国公务员法》，明确了公务员的9项基本义务和16项纪律规范。

2007年10月，党的十七大提出，坚定不移发展社会主义民主政治，明确政治体制改革作为我国全面改革的重要组成部分，必须随着经济社会发展而不断深化，与人民政治参与积极性不断提高相适应。

2008年3月11日，国务院公布第五次机构改革方案，除国务院办公厅外，国务院组成部门调整至27个。

2008年5月1日，《中华人民共和国政府信息公开条例》实施，县级以上各级人民政府和部门主动公开政府信息，并依公民或法人申请公开信息。

2008年5月13日，中共中央印发《建立健全惩治和预防腐败体系2008—2012年工作规划》，要求经过5年的扎实工作，建成惩治和预防腐败体系基本框架。

2008年12月，中共中央转发《中央政法委员会关于深化司法体制和工作机制改革若干问题的意见》，从优化司法职权配置、完善宽严相济刑事政策、加强政法队伍建设、改革司法保障体制等方面，提出60项改革任务。

2010年3月14日，十一届全国人大三次会议通过了修改后的选举法，明确实行城乡按相同人口比例选举人大代表这一重要原则。

2010年10月，国务院发布《国务院关于加强法治政府建设的意见》，规定了提高行政机关工作人员特别是领导干部依法行政的意识和能力、加强和改进制度建设、坚持依法科学民主决策、严格规范公正文明执法、全面推进政务公开、强化行政监督和问责、依法化解社会矛盾纠纷等7个方面的任务。

2010年10月28日，十一届全国人大常委会第十七次会议修订通过《中华人民共和国村民委员会组织法》，新设村民监督委员会。

到2010年底，中国制定现行有效法律236件，行政法规690多件，地方性法规8600多件，中国特色社会主义法律体系已经形成，为依法治国提供了制度保障。

2012年3月14日，十一届全国人大五次会议通过刑事诉讼法修正案，写入尊重和保障人权等内容，同时完善了询问犯罪嫌疑人、被告人的规定，强化对侦查活动的监督。

2012年4月17日，《中共中央国务院关于分类推进事业单位改革的指导意见》公布，以进一步满足人民公益服务需求。

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本报北京5月13日电（记者黄庆畅）改革开放以来，特别是党的十六大以来，我国积极稳妥推进政治体制改革，取得重大进展。

人民民主权利得到充分保障。2004年“国家尊重和保护人权”写入我国宪法；2010年3月选举法修改，明确实行城乡按相同人口比例选举全国人大代表；到2010年底，我国形成了中国特色社会主义法律体系，这些都体现了我国充分保障人民民主权利的进程。2008年12月，中共中央转发《中央政法委员会关于深化司法体制和工作机制改革若干问题的意见》，提出60项改革任务，到今年上半年，司法体制机制改革取得重要阶段性成果。

基层群众自治健康发展。党的十七大报告把“基层群众自治制度”作为中国特色社会主义政治发展道路的重要内容，基层民主自治体系日趋完善。2010年，村民委员会组织法修改，确立了村务监督委员会制度，使民主选举、民主决策、民主管理、民主监督落到了实处。

人民有序政治参与热情高涨。为进一步扩大人民有序政治参与，我国确立了以政务公开打造“阳光政府”的思路，2008年颁布实施政府信息公开条例，各级人大“开门立法”、政府部门召开公共事务听证会成为常态，“三公经费”逐步公开，“网络问政”蓬勃发展，人民群众的知情权、参与权、表达权和监督权得以充分保障，人民实现了内容广泛的当家作主。

政府运行快步走向法制化规范化。党的十六大以来，我国先后于2003年和2008年集中进行了两次行政管理体制改革。国务院经过5次清理，共取消和调整行政审批事项2183项。行政复议和行政诉讼制度建设，让“民告官”成为现实；政府信息公开条例的实施，让政府逐渐适应在老百姓的监督下工作；领导干部和行政执法过错责任追究，给权力戴上了“紧箍咒”。2006年公务员法实施以来，全国有超过24万人通过竞争上岗走上了领导岗位，目前中央机关公开遴选公务员已由“试水”阶段转入正式实施阶段。

政治体制改革稳步推进（深化改革攻坚克难）

郑志文

积极稳妥推进政治体制改革，发展社会主义民主政治，是党和国家始终不渝的奋斗目标。改革开放以来，政治体制改革作为我国全面改革的重要组成部分，始终随着经济社会的发展不断深化，始终随着人民政治参与热情的提高不断深化，始终随着时代进步的潮流不断深化。

从党的领导体制逐步规范化、制度化，到以党内民主带动人民民主的实践；从大刀阔斧地推进机构改革，到建设、完善适应社会主义市场经济的行政管理体制；从废除领导干部职务终身制，到建立国家公务员制度；从实行基层群众自治，到实行城乡按相同人口比例选举人大代表、扩大公民有序政治参与；从加强对权力运行的监督和制约，到建立和完善惩治与预防腐败体系……政治体制改革的不断推进，激发了全党全国各族人民的创造性、积极性和主动性，保持了党和国家活力，扩大了社会主义民主，健全了社会主义法制，促进了我国人权事业进步，促进了经济、政治、文化、社会的全面协调发展，为社会主义现代化事业提供了制度支撑和法治保障。

社会主义民主政治切实保障了人民当家作主的权利，同时又充分显示出最大限度地集中社会资源办大事的优越性。短短30多年时间，我国经济和社会发生了翻天覆地的变化，一跃成为世界第二大经济体，成为国际舞台上有影响力的大国，外界赞叹的“中国速度”、“中国奇迹”，正是中国特色社会主义政治发展道路强大影响力和生命力的生动证明，也是我国政治体制强大生命力和影响力的生动证明。

如果说“权力”和“权利”是民主政治的一体两面，那么近十年来，在政治体制改革的进程中，前者的被“监督制约”和后者的“充分保障”恰成鲜明对比，勾勒出政治体制改革的总体脉络。“制约权力”与“保障权利”的共同之处，在于保证人民当家作主，增强党和国家活力，调动人民积极性。

“制约权力”是指对公权力的监督制约。近十年来，一系列法律法规和规章制度的出台，从实体和程序两个方面，为公权力的运行提供制度框架、划定运行轨道。同时，依法治国、依法行政理念的不断深入人心、不断贯彻实施，也使“限权”成为政治体制改革的目标和出发点。

“保障权利”则是对公民权利的尊重和充实。一方面，人权事业不断推进，公民自身的财产安全和人身权利得到了更加完善的保护；另一方面，随着经济社会的发展，人民的知情权、参与权、表达权、监督权也得到了提升和保障，并以此为推动力，促进了立法、决策的科学化、民主化，成为广大人民依法行使参与管理国家、社会事务权利的重要抓手。

社会主义民主政治是一个吐故纳新的生命体，积极稳妥推进政治体制改革，必须坚持我国根本政治制度和基本经济制度，必须坚持党的领导、人民当家作主、依法治国三者的统一，绝不照搬西方政治模式。只有尊重国情、循序渐进，我们才能不断创造新的中国奇迹，不断收获新的民族自信。

基层群众自治：“三委”并行（深化改革攻坚克难）

“以前是群众怕村干部干事，现在是怕村干部不干事”。这是浙江武义县白洋街道后陈村村民的真实感受。

后陈村位于城乡结合部。过去，由于村务管理不透明，重大决策不民主，一度造成村内矛盾重重，干群关系紧张，村民上访不断。2004年6月18日，后陈村在海选村委会的基础上，建立了全国第一个村级民主监督组织，由群众选举产生村务监督委员会，与村党支部、村委会一起称为“三委会”。村务监督特别是村级财务监督由监委会负责。

随着监委会的成立，后陈村开始了脱胎换骨的变化，不仅村固定收入逐年增加，而且村干部连续8年实现“零违纪”，村民连续8年实现“零上访”。村监委会成立至今，村两委已经顺利完成了3次换届。最近的一次换届，村两委成员一个没动，全部高票当选，一次通过。

目前，浙江省3万多个行政村，村村建立了村务监督委员会，实现了村级监督组织“全覆盖”。2010年，村务监督委员会这一制度创新被写进村民委员会组织法，开始在全国推行。

点评：基层群众自治是社会主义民主的直接体现，是当代中国最直接、最广泛的民主实践。它通过以村民自治为核心的农村基层民主和以居民自治为核心的城市基层民主，将人民民主渗透到社会生活的各个方面。

从一村一地的摸索试验，到全国范围的推广实施，以基层群众自治制度为代表的基层民主建设已经在我国遍地开花，每年的村（居）委会“海选”成为中国民主政治发展的特殊风景。而随着村民委员会组织法等法律和制度的建立和完善，我国的基层群众自治日益成熟和规范。今天，基层群众自治制度已经成为中国特色社会主义民主政治的重要支柱。

全国人大代表选举，实行城乡“同票同权”（深化改革攻坚克难）

康厚明是一位进城务工农民，他和朱雪芹、胡小燕一起，都因为“农民工”的身份当选为十一届全国人民代表大会代表，引起了很多人的关注。在今年3月份的全国两会上，康厚明看到“城乡按相同人口比例选举人大代表”的规定，高兴地说，这是社会主义民主进程的重大进步！

今年3月14日，十一届全国人大第五次会议通过了《关于十二届全国人大代表名额和选举问题的决定》，规定十二届全国人大的代表将实行城乡按相同人口比例选举，按城乡约每67万人分配1名名额。据介绍，每67万人分配1名，是根据第六次全国人口普查数和2010年年底公安部公布的户籍人口数加权平均后作出的规定。

从1953年我国第一部选举法公布实施起到1995年之前，我国农村与城镇每一人大代表所代表的人口比例为8∶1。1995年，全国人大常委会修改选举法，将这一比例调整为4∶1。至2009年，城镇人口比重已达到46.6%。在这一背景下，“城乡同比”原则被明确下来。从8∶1到4∶1到1∶1，人们常说的“同票同权”在国家权力机关组成人员的选举中得以实现。

点评：人民代表大会制度是我国的根本政治制度，对这一制度加以不断地修改完善，是我国政治体制改革的重要组成部分。实行城乡按相同人口比例选举人大代表，体现了实事求是、与时俱进的精神。如果说1953年8∶1的比例规定有助于保证工人阶级在各级人大代表中占相对多数，那么如今城乡“同票同权”，意味着随着我国城镇人口比重的变化，农村人口在选举及政治权利的实现上向宪法规定的平等原则迈出了实质性的一步。这一规定让农民代表的名额得到了制度保障，有助于营造更加公平和谐的社会环境。

开门立法有效体现公正性普惠性（深化改革攻坚克难）

2011年10月26日下午，《家用汽车产品修理、更换、退货责任规定》立法听证会在国家质检总局会议室举行。

“很幸运能被选到参与此次听证会，我将要说的每一句话都代表的是民声民意啊。”四川成都消费者代表张义说，“我在网上发帖、走访朋友、同事，和他们一起深入探讨研究《规定》条文，最终搜集归纳了12条建议和意见。”

除张义这样的消费者代表外，还有汽车生产厂商代表、经销商代表等以及质检总局法规司、质量司等部门的领导或工作人员，会议室中座无虚席。

“对于高昂的检测费用，应建立统一的基金，由汽车厂家交纳保证金。”“亟待设立独立的第三方鉴定机构。”在3个多小时里，代表们或从自己的维权经历，或从自身工作实际出发，逐条对《规定》提出疑问和改进建议。

代表纷纷表示，汽车“三包”立法是一个较为复杂的问题，听证会让多方意见有了交流的平台，必将对汽车“三包”规定的出台产生积极影响。

点评：法律是人民意志的体现。近年来，全国各地都在积极推行“开门立法”，拓展了百姓参与立法的渠道，激发了群众的积极性，不仅可以弥补或修正法律法规的不足或不当之处，而且改变以往“部门立法”所造成的立法部门化、部门利益化、利益法律化等现象，从而更好地实现法律法规的公正性和普惠性。

同时，“开门立法”也是一次政府与群众之间的互动，可以让政府更多更深地了解社情民意，使社情民意成为政府工作的导向；而尊重民意的政府工作也必定会在群众的热情参与中得到顺利的开展，实现最大的社会效益。

信息公开从“三公经费”切入（深化改革攻坚克难）

公开信息是政府的义务，申请政府信息公开是公民的权利。本着这样的想法，广东东莞市民梁杰将该市社保局告上了法庭，原因是他索要社保详细账单未果。

梁杰的底气，来自2008年5月1日正式实施的《政府信息公开条例》，其中明确规定：公民、法人或者其他组织还可以根据自身生产、生活、科研等特殊需要，向国务院部门、地方各级人民政府及县级以上地方人民政府部门申请获取相关政府信息。

政府信息公开，是我国政务公开的一个重要方面。近年来，各级政府的各项工作内容及进程都会及时公开，公民可以通过特定途径，如政务公开栏、政务公开网络等进行查询、监督。

“三公经费”公开，无疑是近年来老百姓最为关切的话题，也是政务公开的重要内容。2011年4月24日，科技部在财政拨款支出说明中率先以文字形式公布“三公经费”预算。此后，中央各部委纷纷效仿。

点评：“公开为原则，不公开为例外。”随着《政府信息公开条例》的实施，我国政府信息公开的工作机制不断完善，制度体系逐步健全，公开范围逐渐扩大，公开载体更加丰富。以信息公开为重点的政务公开，实现了政府更为直接地面对公众，公众更为清晰地了解政府的目标，不但让老百姓的知情权、参与权、表达权、监督权得以落实，也使建设“阳光政府”、“廉洁政府”、“高效政府”的步伐大大加快。

转变政府职能从行政审批制度改革突破（深化改革攻坚克难）

过去，办理项目开工手续一般需要一年以上，现在缩短到100天以内就可以完全办结。海南省设立了省政府政务服务中心，推行行政审批“三集中”（审批事项、审批权力、审批人员）的改革，行政审批的效率明显提高。

姚云亭是海南省杨浦开发区某工程项目的负责人，多年从事工程项目的报批工作。与以往不同的是，如今他在项目报批的过程中，“再也不必拿着一堆报批材料，今天去这个局、明天再去那个厅，需要在省一级审批的，直接把材料交到政务中心的窗口就行了，时间能节省一半。”姚云亭说。

自2008年以来，海南省在各厅局设立专门的行政审批办公室，将原来分散在各分管领导和业务处室的审批权力全部向该办公室集中，行政审批办公室及其工作人员成建制进驻中心，办公室主任就是首席代表。由此，将所有的审批要素集中于政务服务中心，成功解决了以往审批“久拖不决”的现象。

通过改革，34个政府部门的1240项行政审批事项先后进驻中心，中心还对每个审批项目编制办事指南，制订示范文本。

点评：行政审批制度改革，是我国行政管理制度改革的继续和深入，其根本在于，突破传统计划经济观念的束缚，增强社会主义市场经济的意识；突破部门既得利益的束缚，增强改革大局的意识；突破“官本位”思想的束缚，增强服务为先的意识。

近10年来，国务院部门经过5次清理，共取消和调整行政审批事项2183项，占原有总数的60.6%；各省、自治区、直辖市本级共取消和调整行政审批事项36986项，占原有总数的68.2%。行政审批制度改革已经成为转变政府职能、推进社会进步的重要突破口。

公务员管理机制日益规范（深化改革攻坚克难）

今年是我国公务员制度建立的第十九个年头，《公务员法》正式实施也已经6年了。

以《公务员法》为基础，我国已制定颁布了行政机关公务员处分条例，出台了公务员职务与级别、录用、考核、奖励、培训、调任、辞退、申诉等18个配套法规及9部专项处分规章。

在进入机制方面，坚持凡进必考，依法、科学、公平考录。2003年以来，全国共考试录用123万名公务员，2011年录用人数达到17万人。目前，中央机关和省级机关录用公务员，除部分特殊职位外，均从具有两年以上基层工作经历的人员中考录，并建立健全从村（居）党支部书记、大学生村官和工人、农民等基层一线人员中考录公务员制度。

在选任机制方面，大力推行竞争性选拔方式。《公务员法》实施以来全国有超过24万人通过竞争上岗走上了领导岗位，还开展了公开遴选公务员试点。

在激励机制方面，坚持定期奖励和及时奖励相结合。《公务员法》实施以来全国共对255万人次进行了嘉奖、对59万人次记了三等功、对5万人次记了二等功和一等功。

在退出机制方面，进一步规范和畅通了公务员队伍的“出口”，通过调出、退休、辞去公职、辞退、开除等方式，一大批公务员退出了公务员队伍。

点评：党的十六大以来，特别是《公务员法》正式实施的6年来，中国特色公务员法律法规体系基本形成，公务员管理机制日益健全，公务员的素质、能力和作风建设全面加强，公务员制度法制化规范化建设不断推进。实践证明：公务员制度从我国国情出发，与中国特色社会主义政治制度相适应，充分体现和反映了我国政治体制的特点和要求，具有十分鲜明的中国特色。

党的十六大以来政治体制改革大事记（深化改革攻坚克难）

2002年11月，党的十六大提出，必须在坚持四项基本原则的前提下，继续积极稳妥地推进政治体制改革，扩大社会主义民主，健全社会主义法制，建设社会主义法治国家，巩固和发展民主团结、生动活泼、安定和谐的政治局面。

2004年3月14日，十届全国人大二次会议通过《中华人民共和国宪法修正案》，“国家尊重和保障人权”写入宪法。

2004年3月22日，国务院印发《全面推进依法行政实施纲要》，提出经过十年左右坚持不懈的努力，基本实现建设法治政府的目标。

2004年9月9日，中共十六届四中全会审议通过《中共中央关于加强党的执政能力建设的决定》，提出要把我们党建设成为科学执政、民主执政、依法执政的执政党。

2005年4月27日，十届全国人大常委会第十五次会议通过《中华人民共和国公务员法》，明确了公务员的9项基本义务和16项纪律规范。

2007年10月，党的十七大提出，坚定不移发展社会主义民主政治，明确政治体制改革作为我国全面改革的重要组成部分，必须随着经济社会发展而不断深化，与人民政治参与积极性不断提高相适应。

2008年3月11日，国务院公布第五次机构改革方案，除国务院办公厅外，国务院组成部门调整至27个。

2008年5月1日，《中华人民共和国政府信息公开条例》实施，县级以上各级人民政府和部门主动公开政府信息，并依公民或法人申请公开信息。

2008年5月13日，中共中央印发《建立健全惩治和预防腐败体系2008—2012年工作规划》，要求经过5年的扎实工作，建成惩治和预防腐败体系基本框架。

2008年12月，中共中央转发《中央政法委员会关于深化司法体制和工作机制改革若干问题的意见》，从优化司法职权配置、完善宽严相济刑事政策、加强政法队伍建设、改革司法保障体制等方面，提出60项改革任务。

2010年3月14日，十一届全国人大三次会议通过了修改后的选举法，明确实行城乡按相同人口比例选举人大代表这一重要原则。

2010年10月，国务院发布《国务院关于加强法治政府建设的意见》，规定了提高行政机关工作人员特别是领导干部依法行政的意识和能力、加强和改进制度建设、坚持依法科学民主决策、严格规范公正文明执法、全面推进政务公开、强化行政监督和问责、依法化解社会矛盾纠纷等7个方面的任务。

2010年10月28日，十一届全国人大常委会第十七次会议修订通过《中华人民共和国村民委员会组织法》，新设村民监督委员会。

到2010年底，中国制定现行有效法律236件，行政法规690多件，地方性法规8600多件，中国特色社会主义法律体系已经形成，为依法治国提供了制度保障。

2012年3月14日，十一届全国人大五次会议通过刑事诉讼法修正案，写入尊重和保障人权等内容，同时完善了询问犯罪嫌疑人、被告人的规定，强化对侦查活动的监督。

2012年4月17日，《中共中央国务院关于分类推进事业单位改革的指导意见》公布，以进一步满足人民公益服务需求。

Today, just as “Beijing Daily” is again searchable on Sina Weibo, the newspaper has stepped right back into the spotlight of mockery by dragging its favorite whipping boy, U.S. Ambassador Gary Locke, into one of China’s most sensitive ongoing debates — the intransigent issue of the disclosure of the personal finances of Party and government leaders.

Responding yesterday to a Weibo post suggesting Gary Locke is among America’s super-rich and that his common-man antics in Beijing are just a “show,” Beijing Daily wrote on its official Sina Weibo account:

Won’t Gary Locke please disclose his personal assets.
请骆家辉公布财产

[ABOVE: In a post today, the official Sina Weibo account of the official Beijing Daily calls on U.S. Ambassador Gary Locke to disclose his personal assets.]

Oops.

Chinese users pounced on this post this morning, pointing out with no small measure of schadenfreude that U.S. politicians all had to disclose their personal assets, and that these figures were publicly available on the internet for the convenience of all citizens.

Liu Yadong (刘亚东), the editor-in-chief of Science and Technology Daily newspaper, wrote on Sina Weibo:

No matter whether its praise or criticism your dishing out, it must be based on a deep understanding of the other side. Seen from a many sides, Beijing Daily‘s demand that Gary Locke disclose his personal finances is a basic error. It shows a basic lack of understanding of American society: how can that country’s top politicians possibly keep their personal assets secret! To openly make such a childish demand perhaps also reveals the closed-up nature of this newspaper, its lack of international perspective. This is a lesson!

无论表扬还是批评，都必须建立在对受者深入了解的基础上。从多个角度看，北京日报要求骆家辉公布个人财产都是一个低级错误，表明其缺乏关于美国社会的基本常识：那个国家民选的高级公职人员哪能保守财产秘密！公诸如此幼稚的诉求或许还反映出该报的封闭性，没有国际视野。是为训！

Chinese columnist Zhao Chu (赵楚) responded less kindly:

Beijing Daily is a joke. For them to make a joke like this just shows they’re a bunch of stupid pigs at the top.

《北京日报》是个笑话，他们能闹出这样的笑话，可见都是多蠢的猪在局中。

The Beijing Daily Weibo post was removed at 9:57am today, as CMP was watching. The newspaper apparently deleted the original Weibo post and decided the best way to not disclose its own silliness was to re-post the original post here, this time with a simple “re-post” (转发微博) rather than a comment about Gary Locke.

Unfortunately for Beijing Daily, traces are not so easily wiped away in this age when ogling eyes have the means of sharing their own observations. The comments are already stacking up underneath the second post:

His assets were disclosed back in 2010. Why doesn’t he teach Chinese official how to disclose [their assets]?
半拉北京人：人家在2010年就公布了你怎么不教中国官员公布呀 //@北京日报: 转发微博 (10秒前)

Beijing Daily, are you really dumb, or just playing dumb? You think that just by having this title “Beijing” to back you up you can lead public opinion astray?
辣笔小飞: @北京日报 ，你是真傻还是装傻？以为顶了个“北京”的头衔就可以混淆视听了？//@北京日报: 转发微博 (20秒前)

Of course Gary Locke’s personal assets have been disclosed. And what about the assets of those imperial officials [of ours]?
无梦的八戒： 骆家辉的财产肯定是公布了的，天朝官员公布了没？//@北京日报: 转发微博 (20秒前)

“Oh, editors and comrades of Beijing Daily, how are you? How tough things are for you. It’s just that the residence of the Ambassador and the cars he rides in are about the image of America. No matter how we try to refine the idea of whether or not Gary Locke is corrupt, there’s the looming issue of our leaders living in Zhongnanhai. And how much more resplendent are those official residences? Why don’t you have a look.
天恩0120: 北京日报的编辑同志们，你们好，你们辛苦了。只是大使官邸和座驾代表的是美国政府形象，我们怎么琢磨也和骆家辉是否腐败搭不上边，我们的领导人还住中南海呢，那造价比大使官邸又高出多少？请明察//@北京日报: 转发微博 (30秒前)

“What about that post asking Locke to disclose his assets? How was that deleted? How humiliating for the Party!
老男人的小日子: 那条要去骆家辉公布财产的微薄呢 怎么删了 真给党丢脸啊 //@北京日报: 转发微博 (40秒前)

Sina Weibo posts on this story on the personal account of CMP researcher David Bandurski were removed by 10:48am today, May 15, 2012. They can be viewed below:

POST 1
POST 2
POST 3

They also resulted in this delightful bit of correspondence from the platform informing the user that POST 1 has been “secreted” because, “This weibo is not convenient to expose to the outside.”

UPDATE: By 11am today, May 15, 2012, even the simple re-post by Beijing Daily meant to cloak its original comment about U.S. Ambassador Gary Locke had been removed from its official Weibo account, yielding this message from Sina Weibo.

The problem, presumably, was that the re-post itself was getting bombarded with comments from Sina Weibo users referencing the original post.

UPDATE: This final Sina Weibo post by David Bandurski on the Beijing Daily post was deleted sometime before 2:45pm, May 15, 2012.

The suggestion that Locke’s simple gestures were “disgraceful” and showed insufficient respect for China might have found an audience somewhere, but the predominant response to the editorials on Chinese social media seemed to be ridicule. By afternoon of the day the editorials were published, even the search keyword “Beijing Daily” was blocked on Sina Weibo, a virtual admission of propaganda defeat.

Chinese users poked fun at what some clearly saw as the government’s inexplicable objection to honest, genuine and fundamentally human gestures. How exactly should Ambassador Locke act? The following Weibo post, for example, jokingly depicted Locke being subjected to a struggle session of the kind that would have been seen during China’s Cultural Revolution, a placard around his neck listing out his crimes, including “carrying his own backpack.”

The photo’s caption read: “The only way out for Ambassador Locke is to be whole-heartedly corrupt!”

What is perhaps most interesting about Gary Locke’s “little tricks” in China — and perhaps what discomforts Chinese leaders most — is the way Chinese have seized on his actions to reflect back on China’s own political culture. And China’s government has arguably deepened the sense of reflective value by obsessing on Locke’s actions, putting itself in the awkward position of fussing about minutia like backpacks and cups of coffee.

Today, Locke is again grabbing attention for his “little tricks”, this time over a recent exchange with Shanghai third grader Yang Zhimei (杨芷湄), 9, who happens to be the daughter of one of China’s finest investigative reporters, former CMP fellow Yang Haipeng (杨海鹏).

In October 2011, Ambassador Locke made a visit to Shanghai that included a stop at the Museum of Contemporary Art, where he spoke with a number of local primary school students. Yang Zhimei had a brief opportunity to speak with Locke, and her photo was later featured on the website of the U.S. Consulate in Shanghai and in various local media.

Yang Zhimei later made her exchange with Locke the subject of an essay submitted for consideration for China’s Lu Xun Youth Literature Prize. The essay was posted to the competition’s website on May 10, and shared by Zhimei’s father, Yang Haipeng, through his Sina Weibo account yesterday.

The crux of the essay, and of the discussion surrounding it today, is the fact that Ambassador Locke knelt before Yang Zhimei and addressed her at eye level, something that can be seen from several photographs.

A translation of Yang Zhimei’s essay follows:

Ever since I was small I’ve had this dream, that me Dad will “kneel” before me to speak.

My Dad is big and tall, built like a pagoda. Even having grown to this point, I’m a full meter below him, and when I talk to him I have to tilt my head back. While this happens, he’ll answer his phone and start thinking about something else . . . When I can’t say something clearly, he’ll get impatient, and wave me off with his hand: “Go, go go. Go watch that animation flick you like. I’m busy.”

I know he really loves me, but I don’t know how to talk with him. What I like best is going traveling with him. At those times, he’ll have a lot more time, and can patiently listen to what I have to say. He’s more like a “big brother.”

I’ve seen a lot of TV dramas where foreigners will kneel before kids and talk. When the adults kneel they’re the same height as kids, and they can look eye to eye. It looks so amiable. So once I said to my Dad: “Dad, can you kneel when you speak to me?”

Dad would look very amused and smile, saying: “Your Dad is too fat. If he kneels, his pants will split.” Then he’ll laugh this big laugh, and tell me to go back.

It’s really hard to say anything to Dad.

In October last year, I took part in an exhibition of Pixar animation [in Shanghai]. An older woman approached me and said: “Excuse me, little friend, is there something you’d like to ask Ambassador Locke?” This Ambassador Locke she was referring to is an uncle a head shorter than Dad. At the time he was talking to someone else. He’s the U.S. Ambassador, and he was the most important figure in the room. Reporters were clustered around him taking photographs.

Timidly, I went over behind him and said: “Mr. Ambassador, sir, when you were in primary school what was homework like?” The Ambassador turned his head around in surprise and said in English: “Why do you ask this question?” I responded: “This time around, I tested 82 on English, and Mom was really unhappy with me.” I didn’t mention that I was quickly losing faith.

Ambassador Locke and the interpreter “kneeled” down in front of me. I was so surprised I froze. He spoke for more than 10 minutes, and I was terrified by this move of his and all of the camera flashes going off around me. The only thing I remember him saying was that when he was in sixth grade he was just a rookie (菜鸟). One time, he said, he did a really bad thing, and his teacher made him write a self-criticism and even made him read it before the whole class. He thought to himself at the time, I can’t keep on like this, and from that time forward he did his best, becoming a really excellent student.

I don’t remember that much of what he said. My head is just full of that image of him kneeling before me. I can see clearly those eyes of his full of care and love, and those wisps of white hair next to his ears.

At the time, I thought — when will my Dad kneel like this and talk to me?

Later, the photo [of me and Ambassador Locke] made the newspaper. Adults talked about it a lot. Some people admired [what Locke did] while other said “he was just making a show.” A friend of Dad’s who had studied abroad in the United States and come back said all Americans were like this, that they were brought up this way.

My Dad was really in favor of this way of doing things. He said it gave children, who were in a relative position of weakness, a shot at equality. But when I pressed him to “kneel” for me, he only did it twice before things went on just as they had before.

Really, I think it’s much harder for grown ups to change themselves than it is for kids. One time, my Dad told his students that a hundred years ago in Shanghai, it took twenty years to change the habit city residents had of carrying live chickens and ducks through the streets.

I corner Dad and said: “Dad, you say we should speak on terms of equality, but why then can’t you kneel before me to speak like Gary Locke?”

Dad said distractedly that he had hurt his knee hiking in Yunnan, so we could talk about it another time.

I don’t know how long it will be before that “another time” comes.

I dream of the day that I’m just as tall as Dad is. That way he won’t need to kneel before me for us to talk.

On May 8 it was Dad’s birthday and I helped him clean the house. I even made a really pretty card for him. Dad was so happy. He held me and said, “Oh, Sweetheart! Oh, Sweetheart!” Then he asked me what wish I had.

I said to him: “What I want is really simple. If I really am your sweetheart, then please kneel when you talk to me.”

The full Chinese text of Yang Zhimei’s essay follows:

爸爸，请你“跪”下来跟我说话
作者:杨芷湄

上海市江苏路第五小学三（七）班 杨芷湄

从很小的时候，我就有一个梦想：我的爸爸能“跪”下来对我说话。

我的爸爸又胖又高，身体像坐宝塔，我长到现在，还跟他差半米，跟他说话，我要仰着头。中间，他还会接电话，想起什么别的事，拔好手机哇啦哇啦地说一通。我跟他说话，脖子会酸，不知怎么表达。说不清的时候，他会烦躁，扇子一般的大手一挥“去去去，看你的动画片去，我忙着呢”！

我知道他很爱我，但我就是不知道怎样和他说话。我最喜欢和他一起旅行。那时，他会有很多时间，耐心的听我说话，像一个“大哥哥”。

我看电视剧里，有许多外国大人蹲着甚至跪着对小朋友说话，大人蹲下与小朋友一样高，目光可以平视，样子很慈祥。我曾经对爸爸说：“爸爸，你能蹲下来对我说话吗？”

爸爸却嘻皮笑脸地说：“爸爸太胖，蹲下来，裤衩会裂开。”然后哈哈大笑，把我的要求挡回去了。

跟爸爸说句话很不容易。

去年十月，我参加“美国皮克斯动画展”。一个阿姨问我：“小朋友，你想问骆大使一个问题吗？”她所说的骆大使是一个比爸爸个头稍矮的伯伯，正在跟其他人说话。他是美国大使，是这里最大的人物，很多记者围着他拍照片。

我怯怯地走到他身后，说：“大使先生，你小学时候功课怎么样？”大使惊讶地回过头，用英语说：“为什么问这个问题？”我回答道：“我这次英语考了82分，妈妈骂了我。”我没有说自己快没信心了。

骆大使和翻译单膝“跪”在我面前。我惊呆了。他讲了十几分钟，我被他的动作和周围照相机的闪光吓坏了。只听到他说：他在小学六年级前，是只“菜鸟”。有一次，他做了件很坏的事，老师让他写检讨，还让他在全体同学面前读了。他觉得这样下去不行，于是他发奋努力，成为一个优秀的学生。

我没有记住多少他的话。我的脑海只有他们跪下来的画面。我清晰地看到他关爱的眼神，还有耳边的白头发。

那时候，我在想：什么时候我的爸爸，可以跪下来跟我说话？

后来照片上了报纸。大人们讨论很多。有些人赞赏，有些人说“他在作秀”。我爸爸一个美国留学回来的朋友说：美国大人都这样，这是教养。

我爸爸很赞赏这个方式，认为这是给弱者小孩平等的机会。但当我要求他，能不能“跪”下来跟我说话时，他只做了两次，又回到原来的样子。

真的，我觉得大人想改变自己，比小孩都难。有一次，爸爸跟我他的学生说：在一百多年前的上海，改变市民提着活鸡活鸭上公交车的习惯，大约用了二十年。

我插话说：“爸爸，你说应该跟我平等对话，为什么不能像骆家辉一样跪下来跟我说话呢？”

爸爸愣了一下，然后说自己在云南爬山，膝盖坏了，以后再说。

我不知道这个“以后”会多久？

我梦见自己长大，跟爸爸一样高，这样他用不着跪下来跟我说话了。

5月8日，爸爸过生日，我帮他收拾了房间，还制作了漂亮的贺卡。爸爸高兴死了，抱着我“宝贝宝贝”地叫，问我要什么？

我对他说：“我的要求很简单，如果我是你的宝贝，就请你跪下来跟我说话。”

(转自鲁迅青少年文学奖网）

For both the Bo Xilai and Chen Guangcheng stories, examples of control and use of the media are abundant. Most recently, we wrote about how Beijing newspapers were employed last Friday to send a stern message to the United States on its handling of the Chen Guangcheng case, even as the facts and history of Chen’s case were kept entirely out of domestic media.

Back in 2008, and many times afterward, we wrote about Hu Jintao’s media policy, what we termed “Control 2.0.” Essentially, this approach, formalized in Hu Jintao’s speech during a visit to the People’s Daily in June 2008, involved a strategic combination of control and use of the media to accommodate changes to the nature of “news and propaganda work” in information age. Control alone wasn’t enough anymore, said Hu. The Party had to more actively “channel” public opinion by using all sorts of media to get its own version of important stories out.

[ABOVE: President Hu Jintao chats online with web users during a visit to People's Daily Online in June 2008. Behind him stands Li Changchun, China's propaganda czar.]

Aside from the build up of domestic web-based platforms like People’s Daily Online, this strategy involved an international push by state media such as Xinhua News Agency and China Central Television. It also involved the more active “use” of a whole new generation of domestic commercial newspapers that had grown since the late 1990s. “With party newspapers, magazines, and television and radio stations in the lead,” Hu Jintao said, “[we must] integrate the metropolitan media (都市类媒体), the Internet media and other various propaganda resources.”

That is exactly what happened last week, as The Beijing News a paper known for its strong professional tradition, was forced to run an editorial critical of the U.S. handling of the Chen Guangcheng case.

But while China’s leaders have shown a renewed determination — desperation? — to employ press controls to maintain a white-fisted grip on the agenda, they have unwittingly exposed the cost and limitations of control in the face of a networked public with a keen interest in social, economic and political affairs.

This was patently clear last Friday, as the Beijing editorials were widely criticized on Sina Weibo, so that by day’s end China’s censors had to turn on their own propaganda.

[ABOVE: A search in Chinese for "Beijing Daily" returns a message saying the results cannot be shown "according to relevant laws, regulations and policies".]

Friday culminated with an oblique show of courage posted by The Beijing News to its official Weibo at midnight, an admission that it had been forced to run the Chen Guangcheng editorial against its own conscience: “In the still of the deep night, removing that mask of insincerity, we say to our true selves, “I am sorry.” Goodnight.”

Events like those we saw last Friday may suggest that the growth and popularity of social media in China has substantially raised the political cost of media control and other forms of repression.

Whether or not one believes it is politically necessary, media control is a dirty business, and its mechanics are best kept hidden. This is why propaganda directives to media in China have traditionally been delivered by phone and during informal “breeze sessions.” It is also why social media platforms like Sina Weibo have done their utmost to minimize the experience of censorship — for example, by leaving deleted posts on users’ personal pages even as they are invisible to others.

Thanks to Weibo, China’s active censorship of ideas is something millions of Chinese experience daily and directly. And if, like me, you’re a foreign user of Weibo, you too can experience the joys of having your carefully-crafted Chinese sentences “harmonized.”

But while social media controls may be a matter of necessity for China’s jittery leaders, the very act could have a long-term corrosive effect on the Party’s credibility.

We have another good example of this tension today as the tactics of China’s security police have been openly exposed on social media — even as censors have tirelessly removed the traces.

The Sina Weibo account of Wang Xiaoshan, a prominent blogger and activist in China, was apparently removed yesterday. Speaking to the South China Morning Post, Wang said the decision was not Sina’s, although he did not elaborate.

Wang Xiaoshan, writer Murong Xuecun and Zuo Yeben (作业本) — all users discussed intently on Weibo today — were active in the case of blind lawyer Chen Guangcheng.

A blog post by Beijing-based journalist Paul Mooney back in November 2011 makes a record based on an account by writer Murong Xuecun of the involvement of both Zuo Yeben and Wang Xiaoshan in an attempt to visit Chen Guangcheng while he was under house arrest last year.

Murong Xuecun recalls:

Zuo Yeben got a van for us, and helped us plan our trip. To prevent the unexpected, Wang Xiaoshan and I left our wallets and credit cards with our friend Yang Ruichun. We took our IDs and some cash. We mulled over the prospect of travelling back to a previous age. Inside, each of us tried to give ourselves a pep talk: the worst thing that can happen is that you get a beating. Don’t be scared.

Posting on Sina Weibo today, users discussed the dismantling of Wang Xiaoshan’s account, some posting memorial messages — like this one with a single candle emoticon and the words, “In remembrance of Wang Xiaoshan.”

[ABOVE: A Weibo post on May 9, 2012, expresses condolences to Wang Xiaoshan for the removal of his social media account on Sina.]

By noon, however, Wang Xiaoshan’s account was apparently reinstated, as was Murong Xuecun’s (which some had reported was down for a time). But there was news of trouble for Zuo Yeben. As this user posted:

@WangXiaoshan has come back to life, but we have lost @ZuoYeben
@王小山 复活了，可是我们丢了@作业本

In fact, Zuo Yeben’s story played out more or less live on social media, as he was taken away by state security and the, eventually, returned home.

In a Weibo message posted at around 9:54am, documented by a Shanghai-based Weibo user in this post, Zuo Yeben wrote: “Three state security officers have taken me to a hotel . . . in the capital, opened up a room and said they want me to cooperate with their investigation. Things are fine right now.”

The Weibo user from Shanghai responded: “I hope this isn’t the last post [from Zuo Yeben]. I’m re-posting it first, so everybody can keep it in evidence.”

Finally, in a message posted at 12:49pm, Zuo Yeben said: “We’ve finished talking and we’re leaving the hotel now. I’m on the road home, I’ll post a text-as-image file in a bit. ”

That post drew 1,796 reposts and 2,786 comments within 30 minutes, all messages of support.

At 1:24pm, Wang Xiaoshan re-posted the news of Zuo Yeben leaving the hotel on his resuscitated Sina Weibo account: “In these troubled times, it’s good if only the people themselves are OK,” Wang wrote.

At 2:38pm, Zuo Yeben finally posted his text-as-image account of his visit with security police, omitting the details of what was discussed (presumably dealing with Chen Guangcheng). Zuo’s post was called “My First Time” and began: “The sun is shining today, and there is a slight breeze in the streets. But I never thought that today would be the first day that I would disappear.”

Here are several “permission denied” (forcibly deleted) posts documented in the Weibo archive at the Journalism & Media Studies Centre that offer of flavor of the response to the editorials:

POST 1
POST 2
POST 3
POST 4

Searches for “Beijing Daily in Chinese were also disabled on the evening of May 4, bringing up a message that read: “These search results cannot be shown according to relevant laws, regulations and policies.”

The move to arrest conversation of the Beijing editorials could point to what might be characterized as one of the most high-profile failures of Party propaganda we have on record, particularly as it happened in the midst of important U.S.-China meetings.

While the editorials were presumably intended to send a strong message to the United States of China’s unhappiness with the handling of the Chen Guangcheng case, domestic attention seemed to turn almost entirely on the tone and character of the editorials themselves, which many Chinese on social media clearly found embarrassing and exasperating.

Moreover, the editorials may have had the unintended effect of drawing more attention domestically to the Chen Guangcheng case than leaders wished.

One of the most surprising and powerful pronunciations on “Editorial-gate” came at exactly 00:00 today, May 5, 2012, as one of the papers involved, The Beijing News — a paper with a proud though brief tradition of professional journalism — posted a touching plea for forgiveness on its Sina Weibo account, which has more than 1.38 million followers.

The post was accompanied by a black-and-white photo of a circus clown taking a sad and solitary drag on a cigarette, and read:

In the still of the deep night, removing that mask of insincerity, we say to our true selves, “I am sorry.” Goodnight.

在夜深人寂时，卸下言不由衷的面具，对真实的自己说声“对不起”。晚安。

We encourage all to post their replies in support . . . before that post disappears.

Download a PDF version of the Weibo post from The Beijing News, with comments: Beijing News 0000 apology

Essentially, China wants to make a fuss, but prefers what you might call a “medium fuss” to a full-blown fuss through central Party organs like the People’s Daily or through the official Xinhua News Agency.

[ABOVE: An editorial in today's Beijing Daily has strong words for the United States and the "hostile forces" of the West.]

The “Why Beijing?” question also puzzled Chinese readers today, such as Sichuan television journalist Miao Hong (妙红), who posed the question on Sina Weibo: “What puzzles me is: why is it Beijing Daily?”

In total, four editorials were run today (we’re excepting the Global Times), all in paper’s formally overseen by city-level Party leaders. The most confrontational of the editorials came from Beijing Daily, the official mouthpiece of Beijing’s Municipal Party Committee and its top leader, Liu Qi (刘淇).

That editorial, which accused U.S. Ambassador Gary Locke of playing “little tricks”, said that blind activist Chen Guangcheng represented not ordinary Chinese but only his “backstage boss, namely the interests of the hostile forces of the West.” It said Chen had become “a tool and pawn by which politicians in the United States blacken China.”

Editorials were also run in the Beijing Times and The Beijing News — which came under the management of Beijing city leaders only late last year — and Beijing Youth Daily, which is published by the Beijing chapter of the Chinese Communist Youth League.

The inclusion of the Beijing Times and The Beijing News in the editorial mix today was of particular note, as until recently both papers, which have substantial circulations, were central-level publications — the former a spin-off of the People’s Daily, the latter under Guangming Daily. The Beijing News in particular has long had a reputation as one of China’s top professional newspapers, and its brazen use in today’s salvo was upsetting to many Chinese journalists.

Veteran news editor and former CMP fellow Gong Xiaoyue (龚晓跃) wrote on Sina Weibo: “The Beijing News has been raped. And Beijing Daily has again screwed out a climax. No one seems to have any shame.”

The editorial on page A3 of today’s The Beijing News, “Foreign Diplomats Cannot Overstep Their Own Role” (外交官不能逾越自己的本分), employs far less severe language than the Beijing Daily editorial, but criticizes the United States over the Cheng Guangcheng affair: “Over this incident, some American diplomatic personnel have beyond a doubt played a disreputable role,” it said.

[ABOVE: Page A3 of today's The Beijing News with an editorial critical of the U.S. handling of the Chen Guangcheng case.]

The Beijing Youth Daily editorial, run on page 2, was called, “Making a ‘Show’ Does Not Serve the Preservation of the Overall U.S.-China Relationship” (“作秀”无助于维护中美关系大局). The editorial directly criticized Ambassador Locke for what it depicted as his willful dramatization of Chen Guangcheng’s departure from the U.S. embassy.

When Chen Guangcheng left the American Embassy in China on May 2, Ambassador Gary Locke was all drama and flair (大秀特秀). Not only did he “personally” escort Chen Guangcheng to a hospital in Beijing, but in the hospital he “personally” pushed Chen Guangcheng’s wheelchair, both of them appearing before the glare of the foreign media.

[ABOVE: Page 2 of today's Beijing Youth Daily carries an editorial, second from the top, criticizing the U.S. handling of the Chen Guangcheng case.]

In fact, the real impact of the editorials within China is inconclusive. By the end of the day much of the attention inside China had turned not on the United States or Chen, but on the editorials themselves and what they had to say about China’s own message and methods.

Writing on Sina Weibo, one of China’s most popular social media platforms, one user remarked: “Beijing Daily can only represent the views of itself! What era is this we’re living in? . . . We still have these people trying to make personal political gains. They go against the arguments and ideas of civilization . . . The most apt market for them would be North Korea, not a modern-day China in which Deng’s reform and opening polices are advocated.”

“Every sentence in that stupid editorial in Beijing Daily is full of blather,” said one user on Weibo. They continued satirically: “It’s been a long time since I’ve seen an article of such a high standard.”

“Just ace!” wrote one user on Sina Weibo before invoking Premier Wen Jiabao’s recent warning in the midst of the ouster of Chongqing leader Bo Xilai, in which Wen said China risked repeated the horrors of the Cultural Revolution. “It seems that it’s not just possible that the Cultural Revolution might be repeated. It’s already being repeated at Beijing Daily!”

A user listed as being from Liaoning province remarked snidely on a line from the Beijing Daily editorial meant to criticize American diplomats: “Beijing Daily says that the 1.3 billion people of China aren’t so easily deceived. I do agree with that sentence.” To which another user responded: “I hope that starting from tomorrow the Beijing Daily bears that sentence in mind every day: the 1.3 billion people of China aren’t so easily deceived.”

Another journalist writing on Sina Weibo today said that “the Global Times and Beijing Daily aren’t media but are clubs wielded by the Party, tools of the emperor, the watchdogs of certain groups.”

Caixin Media, the professional news outfit run by former Caijing magazine founder and editor-in-chief Hu Shuli (胡舒立), noted on its official Weibo account:

[Media Under Management of Beijing Municipal Propaganda Department, Beijing Commission of the Chinese Communist Youth League Criticize U.S. Conduct Over Chen Incident] Beijing Daily, the Beijing Times, The Beijing News and Beijing Youth Daily have issued relevant commentaries. For the commentaries see this link. Up to now, Chinese media and Chinese authorities have not reported the full sequence of events in the Chen affair.

[ABOVE: A Weibo post from Caixin Media sends readers to coverage of today's Beijing editorials and notes that the facts of the Chen Guangcheng case have not been shared with Chinese.]

The second link in the Caixin Media post directed readers to a full synopsis of the commentaries appearing today in Beijing media. In its pull-out summary at the top of the article, Caixin noted that the Beijing media had singled Chen Guangcheng out as “a representative anti-social and anti-institution figure” (反社会、反体制的代表人物).

While the Caixin piece sticks to the basic facts about today’s spate of editorials, its implications seem clear enough — that these editorials misrepresent the Chen case to the public, which has had no access to the full facts of Cheng Guangcheng’s case.

In clear contradiction to the inflammatory language of today’s Beijing Daily editorial, Jerome Cohen has noted repeatedly Chen Guangcheng’s explicit interest in resolving his rights concerns through China’s institutions.

You know, Chen Guangcheng said to me once, why can’t I go into court and settle these problems? Do they want me to go into the streets? I don’t want to go into the streets.

Translated portions of the editorial in Beijing Daily follow:

“Reading the Measly Performance of U.S. Politicians through the Cheng Guangcheng Affair”
Beijing Daily
May 4, 2012
Page 3

. . . The United States and other Western countries have paid particular attention to Chen Guangcheng for some time. It is through the packaging of the United States and Western media that this so-called “rights defense hero” has been marked as a striking political symbol, and has become established as representative figure opposing society and opposing the system. But looking at again at the situation, it is clear that Chen Guangcheng cannot represent very many. Who he really represents is the backstage boss, namely the interests of the hostile forces of the West. Chen Guangcheng has already become a tool and pawn by which politicians in the United States blacken China. . .

. . . It must be said that for some time, the American Embassy in China and the new U.S ambassador to China, Gary Locke, have used various means that are incommensurate with their roles and responsibilities — their “little tricks” have continued unabated. This causes people to ask, is it the role of this ambassador to do his utmost to advance the U.S.-China relationship, bridge gaps and eliminate misunderstandings, or is it to hatch schemes and bound out into Chinese society to make trouble, manufacturing new and greater fissures between China and the United States.

. . . If the United States truly wishes to develop a good long-term relationship with China, then it must not persist in pandering to, and even encouraging, extreme language and actions from a few that damage the stability of Chinese society. By the same token, if Gary Locke wants to serve as a good ambassador then he must be more earnest and serious, not employing these under-the-table deals, these ugly little affairs that only bring disgrace to himself. . .

Today, the importance of the U.S.-China relationship cannot be over-estimated. But what is shot through with contradictions is that American politicians will so lightly make a show of these actions that show insufficient maturity and are insufficiently dignified, so that it seems they always are looking to upset China, so that it seems they are alway looking to seek trouble out in Chinese society. The Chen Guangcheng affair is one example. And for the discerning these kinds of actions are vulgar and clumsy. The facts show that the principles obstacle to the advancement of U.S.-China relations lies with the United States. The United State must learn to respect China’s core interests. It must learn to treat with China on the basis of equality. “Do unto others as you would have the do unto you.” Holding up the banners of “human rights”, “freedom” and “democracy” to make trouble will only expose one’s own ugliness, and will have no impact on China. Nor is it good for the United States.

In advancing U.S.-China relations, there must be equality and mutual understanding. As to the differences that exist, these must be resolved satisfactorily through dialogue and exchange, enhancing mutual understanding in order to avoid impacting the larger climate of U.S.-China relations. It should be said that in handling U.S.-China relations China’s attitude is consistent, candid and practical. For a win-win relationship between the U.S. and China, “the way to get along” must be through mutual respect and mutual cooperation. If American politicians can set aside their messy and twisted thinking (歪心思) and read up thoroughly on the canon of U.S.-China relations, then the interest of the people of both China and the United States can be satisfied.

According to a news report from Caixin Media today — which happens to be World Press Freedom Day — the position of party secretary at the Nanfang Daily Media Group will now be held by Yang Jian (杨健), who served most recently as deputy minister of Guangdong’s provincial propaganda department.

This is the first time a top position at the group will be held by an “outsider,” sources say, and the first time the top positions — party secretary (党委书记) and director (社长) — will be held separately.

“There were several attempts in the past to install Party officials at the top level of the Nanfang Daily Group, but these attempts were always successfully opposed by the group,” one former top editor told CMP.

[ABOVE: Yang Jian, former deputy propaganda minister of Guangdong and previously head of Xinhua News Agency's Guangdong bureau, will take over as party secretary of the Nanfang Daily Media Group.]

In the past, the top positions at the Nanfang Daily Media Group have been held by a single individual emerging from within the group and respectful of its unique, often pioneering character as a news organization. Former directors like Fan Yijin (范以锦), who participated in the launch of professionally-inclined newspapers like Southern Weekend and The Beijing News, have commanded respect within the organization and in the Chinese journalism profession at large.

Yang Xingfeng (杨兴锋), who is stepping aside as party secretary at the group to make room for Yang Jian, will reportedly continue to serve as the group’s director.

Yang Xingfeng began work as a news reporter at Nanfang Daily in 1982 and rose through the organization, becoming the group’s editor-in-chief in 2001 and party secretary and director in November 2006.

The irony of this move at the top of one of China’s top press groups coming on World Press Freedom Day did not escape users on Sina Weibo. “On World Press Freedom Day, there is change at the Nanfang Daily Group,” wrote one user, linking to the report from Caixin Media on ifeng.com.

Another user wrote: “There’s a personnel change at the Nanfang Daily Group. Will it be readable after this?”

But perhaps the best indication of what the change at the top at the Nanfang Daily Media Group could mean came in a post made to a verified Sina Weibo account by an “investigator” for the Hubei provincial propaganda department:

The Nanfang Daily Group’s public opinion guidance will now be more correct, and more authoritative!
南方报业的舆论导向将更准确、权威！

The English-language version of the editorial, with slight variations from the Chinese, is still (not surprisingly) available under the headling “US embassy in a quandary over Chen.”

Of the top five search results for the editorial on the Chinese search engine Baidu at noon today, two (Yanzhao Metropolis Daily and 21CN) were still active). The other three results, including for the Global Times website, returned warnings saying the page was no longer available.

[ABOVE: A screenshot showing the top 5 search results returned on May 2 for a Global Times editorial about blind activist Chen Guangcheng.]

Censorship of terms related to Chen Guangcheng remains strong this week on social media. Search tests on Weibo performed by CMP showed that the following terms all returned warnings saying the results could not be shown “according to relevant laws, regulations and policies”:

1. Chen Guangcheng [Chinese] (陈光诚)
2. “Chen Guangcheng” [English]
3. “Guangcheng” [English]
4. “blind man” [English]
5. “blind person” [English]
6. “blind” [English]
7. “blind person” [Chinese] (盲人)
8. 陈GC [Chinese surname with English abbreviation of name]
9. “CGC” [English abbreviation of full name
10. Guangcheng [Chinese name minus surname] (光诚)
11. Linyi [Chinese] (临沂)
12. “Linyi” [Pinyin romanization for prefecture in Shandong where Chen Guangcheng was held]

[ABOVE: A screenshot showing the English-language version of the May 2 Global Times editorial about blind activist Chen Guangcheng.]

The full Chinese-language version of the Global Times editorial follows:

环球时报：挟洋能自重的时代早已过去
2012-05-02 08:57:38 燕赵都市网 www.yzdsb.com.cn

近日围绕山东临沂盲人陈光诚的事情，美国等西方国家媒体出现惊人的报道量。这些报道纷纷说陈光诚已经“闯入”北京的美国驻华使馆，并且向中国政府提出一些个人要求。美国国务院发言人在记者会上连续以“无可奉告”回答包括陈光诚究竟在不在美国使馆等提问，美国领导人则避免提及陈光诚的名字。

陈光诚一段时间以来一直被形容为中国地方政府的“烫手山芋”，现在终于美国政府也变得十分难受了。陈光诚不是当年的方励之，也不是不久前的王立军，他的抱怨大多是一个村民针对基层官员的，所涉层面很低，很多都让清官“难断”。他从临沂跑进美国使馆，很多具体的难题一下子变成了美国的。

如果美国政府把陈光诚的要求当成很正经的东西拿到对华谈判桌上，大概他们自己都会不好意思。况且美国政府很清楚，具体“指挥”中国人如何如何做，这犯了干涉中国内政的大忌，北京断不会理睬它。

每个国家都积累了一些民怨，谁也都知道中国一些人上访的复杂性，如果上访失败者转去向美国驻华使馆“上访”，这决非仅仅是中方的尴尬，美方的尴尬只会更多。

谁说美国政府真的有兴趣帮助所有自认为受到不公平对待的中国人？美国使馆大概不想变成接待“告洋状”的“信访办”，他们更希望向中国人宣扬“普世价值”，偶尔找一两个有价值的典型“帮帮”。他们从未表现出愿意卷入中国社会要多少有多少的具体纠纷之中。

无论最初是怎么回事，陈光诚被西方舆论和中国一些人捧成“盲人维权英雄”，这像是给陈光诚本人造成了“他对美国的确很重要”的错觉。他对自己个人在中国影响力的认识也脱离了实际，一些舆论对他的利用和忽悠似乎毁掉了他的判断力。

中美关系不应该受陈光诚事件的影响，即将举行的中美战略与经济对话也不太可能为了他单独辟出时间，否则将是奇怪的。中美关系没那么小。

挟洋自重仍是一些失意中国人对解决问题的思路之一。其实这种想法已经很烂。今天的中国如此强大，外国政府能够主导或者调控中国人做事方向的时代早已一去不复返。最近几十年，一头扑进西方怀里而不顾及中国社会感受的人，没有一个获得他们期望的“成功”。

人权进步说到底需要一个社会的综合发展和进步支撑，需要全社会投入大量人力物力细心雕琢。西方社会向中国输送了人权观念，中国对它总体上是接受的，在中国没有该不该发展人权的思想对立，一些所谓的“人权对立”通常是对具体难处和矛盾朝人权方向的生拉硬扯。

中国进一步发展人权的动力来自中国内部，西方已无能力继续在人权领域推动中国。西方自己的人权问题在越积越多，既无财力物力支持中国，也缺少在中国崛起并对其构成竞争的时候真诚帮中国出主意的胸怀。西方现在给中国出的主意经常驴唇不对马嘴。“人权”现在更像是美国政府给中国添乱的口实，解决中国的问题非其所愿。

在中国这样复杂的大国里，陈光诚的故事被简单标签化的程度反映了西方舆论的巨大能量以及它们的胡作非为。过去陈光诚在临沂基层，“错”全怪到中国政府头上。现在他据说进了美国使馆，情况出现戏剧性的变化。

我们很想看看，美国政府究竟怎么做，才能让陈光诚和西方舆论都“非常满意”。

If Chen Guangcheng is indeed under U.S. protection, the delicate matter of Chen’s escape (already potentially damaging in light of the constant refusal of Chinese officials to deal with clear and systematic abuses) has now become a major diplomatic matter.

The sensitivity of the Chen Guangcheng story can be glimpsed today both in the total blanket of silence that has enveloped Chinese traditional media, and in the robustness of social media controls.

CMP was able to find no coverage of Chen Guangcheng whatsoever in traditional media, and so far (as of 6pm today) there has been no official word from official outlets like Xinhua News Agency.

Following a flurry of discussion of Chen Guangcheng on Chinese social media Friday, we see far more robust controls today. Nearly all possible searches have been blocked, and even the Chinese word for “blind person”, or mang’ren (盲人) — Chen Guangcheng lost his sight during his early childhood — turns up the familiar warning that: “According to relevant laws, regulations and policies, these search results cannot be shown.”

[ABOVE: A search for the words "blind person" brings a warning from Sina Weibo that the search results cannot be shown.]

A number of other search terms we attempted are shown below, with images of the warnings returned from Sina Weibo.

[ABOVE: A search for the Chinese surname of Cheng Guangcheng, but replacing the last two characters of his name with the letters "GC" brings a warning from Sina Weibo that results cannot be shown.]

[ABOVE: A search for the English initials of the three Chinese characters making up Chen Guangcheng's name, "CGC", brings a warning from Sina Weibo that results cannot be shown.]

[ABOVE: A search for Linyi (临沂), the now-infamous prefecture in Linyi where Chen was held under house arrest for 19 months, brings a warning from Sina Weibo that results cannot be shown.]

[ABOVE: A search for the word "embassy" (大使馆) brings a warning from Sina Weibo that results cannot be shown.]

[ABOVE: A search for a shortened form of "U.S. embassy" (美使馆) brings a warning from Sina Weibo that results cannot be shown.]

[ABOVE: A search for the word "consulate" (领事馆) brings a warning from Sina Weibo that results cannot be shown.]

So how do you talk at all about the Chen Guangcheng story on social media? It seems to be a game of cat and mouse with diminishing prospects for the mice — at least over this particular story.

But we did happen across this post by Chinese professor Zhu Dake (朱大可), who wrote cryptically:

[The Story of the Mole] Once upon a time there was a mole who was surrounded by a pack of wolves, but with the help of some mice he managed to escape. The wolves were furious. The mole’s older and younger brothers, his mother and his baby still lived in the burrow. They became the hostages of the wolves. The escaped mole hid in the forest and called out to the lion, but the lion could not hear his fragile voice. The mice in the walls and the mice in the field all passed along the welcome news, but they couldn’t decide whether the [mole's] escape was a victory, or whether it was just the beginning of more hardship.

【鼹鼠的故事】从前有只鼹鼠被狼群围着，却在老鼠帮助下逃走了。狼们很生气。窝里还有鼹鼠哥哥，鼹鼠弟弟，鼹鼠妈妈和鼹鼠宝宝。它们成了狼的人质。逃走的鼹鼠躲在森林里向狮子喊话，但狮子听不见这微弱的声音。家鼠和田鼠们互相传播着喜讯，但它们也弄不清，逃亡究竟是胜利，还是另一轮苦难的开始。

As I told The New York Times late last week, “We haven’t seen this kind of direct meddling with the media across the board in a long, long time.” And we certainly have not seen the sort of biaotai (表态) — or affirmation of loyalty toward the central leadership — that we have seen in recent weeks on China Central Television and in local Party paper editorials since the aftermath of the crackdown on democracy demonstrators in Beijing in June 1989.

[ABOVE: A local Party cadre says on the official nightly newscast on April 11 that "all local Party cadres must maintain unity with the Central Committee of the CCP through and through."]

We may speculate over whether the shift in the political winds in recent weeks will or will not bring substantive change on key issues like political reform. But certainly the politics we have seen at play in the Bo case hearken back to the past, not to the future. This is old-style power politics — and it’s the factions or alliances that happen to hold sway that get to control the news coverage.

For China’s Party-run media, apparently, the recent success of the imposed monopoly of the Party line on the Bo Xilai story is a source of pride.

The Oriental Morning Post, a leading commercial newspaper in Shanghai, reports today on a talk given at Fudan University this week by Zhang Yannong (张研农), the director (or top Party official) at the CCP’s official People’s Daily.

In his talk, “The People’s Daily‘s Historical Undertaking and Pursuit of Innovation” (《人民日报的历史担当与创新追求》), Zhang spoke openly about how editorials in the People’s Daily had “set the tone” (确定了基调) for the Bo Xilai affair and had “served to create unity of thought for the Party and nation, and to reassure the public and stabilize the overall situation.”

In its treatment of the Bo Xilai affair, Zhang added, the People’s Daily had “shown a powerful capacity for channeling public opinion, and had had great value.” Moreover, it should be “written into political history and journalism history.”

[ABOVE: Zhang Yannong, the director of the CCP mouthpiece People's Daily, tells an audience at Shanghai's Fudan University that the paper made "political history" with its "channeling" of the Bo Xilai affair.]

The following is a portion of Zhang Yannong’s speech at Fudan University:

Most recently the news that has gotten the most attention concerns the Bo Xilai affair. In propaganda and reporting on this story, the People’s Daily, and particularly the editorial section of the People’s Daiy, played an important role. If you opened the April 11 edition of any newspaper, whether it was a paper paper or a metropolitan newspaper, they basically all ran the People’s Daily editorial “Strongly Supporting the Correct Decisions of the Party’s Central Committee“. The two editorials that followed, “Conscientiously Safeguarding a Good Situation for Stable Reform and Development” and “Conscientiously Observing Party Discipline and National Laws”, also had an immense impact.

These three opinion pieces were done within a period of two days by a pair of young “post-80s” [writers] under the direction of the head of our editorial department. Aside from these three opinion pieces, we also successively ran eight related editorials in the “Today’s Topic” column on the front page. If we can say that the news releases [from Xinhua News Agency] were only about relaying information, then these editorials were about setting the tone. To a great extent, they served the purpose of uniting the thoughts and understanding of the Party and the nation [on the Bo Xilai affair], reassuring the public and stabilizing the overall situation. These reports and articles made the situation known in a timely manner, and also offered timely viewpoints, having a powerful public opinion channeling capacity, and vested with high political value, news value and practical relevance. They should be written into political history, and into the history of journalism. The role played by the People’s Daily during this affair has illustrate very well that the People’s Daily is still the first and foremost representative of mainstream public opinion (主流舆论) in our country.